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The most intriguing finding in the preceding chapter is the extraordinary
parallelism of velocity in the United States and the United Kingdom,
especially since 1905 (see chart 5.5). We have attributed the deviations
before 1903 primarily to the growing financial sophistication of the
United States, but they may also reflect the greater inaccuracy of the
earlier data for both the United States and the United Kingdom.
The parallelism presumably reflects both similar money-holding pro-
pensities in the United States and the United Kingdom for more than
two-thirds of a century and a largely common set of factors determining
the number of weeks of income that residents of the United States and the
United Kingdom chose to hold as money. The alternative is to attribute
the parallelism to an accidental offsetting of differences in propensities by
differences in the factors affecting the amount of money held. The
parallelism therefore suggests that we can use the data for the two
countries as if they came from a single parent universe in trying to identify
the factors determining the behavior of velocity. That is the task of the
present chapter. The parallelism also suggests that it is worthwhile ex-
ploring the influences connecting the two countries. That is the task of
chapter 7.
An analysis of the behavior of velocity is an analysis of the demand for
money. As we noted in chapter 2, we can express the "real" quantity of
money in various ways: most directly, as a quantity of money divided by a
price index (as in equation 7 in chap. 2) or, as is frequently more
meaningful in comparing different countries or widely separated periods,
by the device used in chapter 5, as the number of weeks of income or
consumption to which the quantity of money is equivalent. The income
velocity of circulation is simply the reciprocal of the number of weeks of
income held as money, which is why an analysis of velocity is equivalent
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to an analysis of the demand for money. Velocity is usually expressed per
year rather than per week and hence, as usually expressed, is equal to the
reciprocal of the number of weeks of income held as money times
fifty-two. But that is simply a question of units. The percentage rate of
change of weeks-of-income held as money is equal in numerical value but
opposite in sign to the rate of change of velocity.
If velocity is viewed in terms of the demand for money, we must, as in
any demand study, distinguish "desired" or "demanded" quantities from
actual quantities and actual quantities from measured quantities. Desired
and actual quantities may differ because the demand function in question
involves a different level or stage of adjustment—a different Marshallian
period—than corresponds to the observed quantity; because, that is, we
admit that demanders may be "off" their demand curve of the kind in
question. And actual quantities may differ from measured quantities
because of errors of measurement.
The simplest explanation of measured velocity and its movements is
that velocity is the ratio of two independent magnitudes, each determined
by a separate set of forces. This explanation is consistent with the view
that (1) there does not exist a stable demand for money as a function of a
small number of variables; or (2) there exists a stable function but it has a
special form, for example, Keynesian absolute liquidity preference, so
that velocity adapts passively to the separate movements in income and
money; or (3) the errors of measurement of numerator and denominator
dominate the fluctuations of velocity. Section 6.1 demonstrates that our
data are inconsistent with this explanation.
At the opposite extreme doctrinally is the explanation that desired
velocity is a numerical constant—a simple-minded quantity theory rather
than Keynesian theory. On this explanation, observed deviations from
constancy reflect either errors of observation or differences between
actual and desired velocity. This extreme quantity theory must be re-
jected. Yet it is impressive how far it carries us in explaining (1) the
movements of aggregate income, if the quantity of money is regarded as
exogenous; or (2) the movements of aggregate quantity of money, if
income is regarded as exogenous and the quantity of money as demand-
determined (i.e., an adaptive supply) (sec. 6.2).
To go beyond these simple theories, we must investigate the effect of
other variables on the quantity of money demanded. In view of the
findings of the previous chapter, one variable that we must allow for in
some way or another is the changing financial sophistication in the United
States—which we regard as the chief explanation for the difference
between the United States and the United Kingdom in the level and trend
of velocity before 1902 (sec. 6.3). Beyond this, we consider the possible
influence of real per capita income (sec. 6.4), of population and prices207 Velocity: A Will-o'-the Wisp?
(sec. 6.5), and of the cost of holding money (sec. 6.6). Finally in section
6.7, we consider the joint influence of these variables.
6.1 Velocity: A Will-o'-the Wisp?
As we indicated in chapter 2, much recent literature deriving its in-
spiration, though not always its details, from Keynes's General Theory
treats nominal income as if it were determined by forces largely indepen-
dent of the quantity of money, so that velocity adjusts passively.
1 Carried
to its limits, this interpretation makes velocity—and its reciprocal—the
ratio of two statistically independent magnitudes.
2 In that extreme case,
the correlation between income and money would be zero and the
variance of the logarithm of weeks of income held as money would be
equal to the sum of the variances of the logarithms of income and money,
and hence larger than either.
This interpretation is clearly not valid for levels of income, money, and
weeks of income. The simple correlation between the logarithms of
income and money is .992 for the United States and .991 for the United
Kingdom for the period as a whole, and its lowest value for separate
periods before and after 1914 is .980. As a result, the variance or standard
deviation of the logarithm of weeks of income is much less than the
variance or standard deviation of the logarithms of either money or
income.
However, few if any proponents of this interpretation would apply it to
the levels of income, money, and velocity for a long period. They grant
that in the long run the desired ratio of money to income is not indefi-
nitely malleable, that it would be impossible to multiply nominal income
manyfold without something like a corresponding rise in the quantity of
money. They view velocity as malleable over shorter periods—perhaps
over periods even shorter than the phases that are our units of observa-
tion.
1. See J. G. Gurley and E. S. Shaw, Money in a Theory of Finance, Washington, D. C:
Brookings Institution, 1959; (Radcliffe) Committee on the Working of the Monetary
System, Report, Cmd. 827, London: HMSO, 1959; R. S. Sayers, "Monetary Thought and
Monetary Policy in England," Economic Journal 70 (December 1960): 710-24.
2. For example, Alvin Hansen, the leading American disciple of Keynes, wrote in 1957
(The American Economy, p. 50): "I think we should do well to eliminate once and for all,
the phrase 'velocity of circulation' from our vocabulary. Instead, we should simply speak of
the ratio of money to aggregate spending. The phrase 'velocity of circulation' is, I feel,
unfortunate because those who employ it tend to make an independent entity out of it and
imbue it with a soul. This little manikin is placed on the stage, and the audience is led to
believe that it is endowed with the power of making decisions directing and controlling the
flow of aggregate spending. In fact it is nothing of the sort. It is a mere residual. We should
get on much better if we substitute the word 'ratio.' The little manikin would then be forced
back into oblivion, where it properly belongs."208 Velocity and the Demand for Money
A more relevant application is therefore to the rates of change of
money, income, and weeks of income. It could be that there is a fairly
well determined relation between the trends of money and income but
that deviations from the trends are largely attributable to forces affecting
money and income separately, so that deviations of weeks of income
from its trend are a largely passive consequence.
3 However, this applica-
tion too is contradicted by the standard deviations and correlation coef-
ficients in table 5.6. For the period as a whole, including and excluding
war years, for two subperiods, and for both the United States and the
United Kingdom, the correlations between the rates of change of income
and money range from .73 to .95, and the rate of change of weeks of
income fluctuates less than the rates of change of both nominal income
and money.
4
Taken as a whole, the evidence is decisive that movements in the rate
of change of money are accompanied by sufficiently closely correlated
movements in the same direction in the rate of change of income to make
the rate of change of weeks of income or of velocity decidedly more stable
than either of its components. Velocity is not simply or even mainly a
will-o'-the-wisp, over either periods measured in decades or periods
measured in phases.
6.2 Velocity: A Numerical Constant?
Velocity, as measured, is clearly not a numerical constant. However,
measured velocity differs from "true," "permanent," or "desired" veloc-
ity for two reasons: errors of measurement, and deviations between
actual and "desired" velocity. May these deviations not explain the
failure of measured velocity to be a numerical constant?
In terms of the demand for money, this interpretation taken literally
says that the demand function has a special form:
(1) M = kY,
where M is the nominal quantity of money, Y is nominal income, both
measured accurately, and A: is a numerical constant equal to the recipro-
3. The world "largely" is required in this statement because there must be some mecha-
nism to bring the various series back to the trend lines, hence the deviations from trend
cannot be wholly random. However, for short periods, the independent transitory elements
in money and income could dominate the related systematic elements.
4. A positive correlation does not alone guarantee this result:
gv = gr ~ gM
+
 a«M ~
If agY=vgM, then rgygM must exceed 0.5 for vgv to be less than both <rgY and agM. If (Tg ±ag ,r must exceed half the ratio of the larger to the smaller to assure that <jgv is less
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cal of velocity. It says that if M can be regarded as exogenous, and
money-holders are always on the demand curve defined by equation
(1), then nominal income at time Twill be — M(T). Alternatively, if
/c
nominal income is regarded as exogenous, and the quantity of money as
passively adapting to the quantity demanded, then the nominal quantity
of money at time Twill be kY(T). Note that equation (1), as the preced-
ing sentence indicates, is itself completely neutral about the much dis-
cussed question of "direction of influence" or "causal significance." It
simply says that if equation (1) is the demand function for money and if
money-holders are on their demand function and if M and Y are mea-
sured accurately, then M and Y will move together in fixed proportion.
The observation that M and Y do move together would leave entirely
open the question which is the "cause" and which the "effect," or
whether both are the common "effect" of still other variables.
The significant time trends in velocity for long periods for the United
States and the United Kingdom (e.g., for the period before World War I,
the United States regression has a slope of - .024 with a standard error of
.0014; the United Kingdom regression has a slope of + .0018 with a
standard error of .0006) is alone sufficient to rule out this simple version.
Presumably, trends average out both statistical errors and deviations
between actual and desired balances.
A more sophisticated version, like the more sophisticated will-o'-the-
wisp explanation, allows for time trends, regarding the demand equation
as
(2) M(T) = k(T)Y(T),
where T is time and k(T) is some simple function of time (such as a
semilog trend), since if k(T) were left completely free, equation (2) could
be regarded as an identity defining k(T).
5
This version too can be rejected out of hand. A sufficient basis for
rejecting it is the close parallelism of the deviations of velocity about
trends in the United States and the United Kingdom for over two-thirds
5. J. P. Gould and C. R. Nelson, "The Stochastic Structure of the Velocity of Money,"
American Economic Review 65 (June 1974): 405-18, assert that there is no significant trend
in our velocity series for the United States from 1869 to 1960—that, on the contrary, it can
be regarded as a random walk without drift. On their interpretation, the data are consistent
with equation (1) plus stochastic disturbances. Houston H. Stokes and Hugh Neuberger,
"A Note on the Stochastic Structure of the Velocity of Money: Some Reservations,"
American Economist 23 (fall 1979): 62-64, demonstrate that the Gould-Nelson result is
produced by combining nonhomogeneous periods and that for the period 1879-1940 the
trend is significant, and the series is not a random walk with drift, that is, neither equation
(1) nor equation (2) plus stochastic disturbances is acceptable. The next paragraph of our
text, plus the rest of this chapter, provides additional and in our view decisive evidence
contradicting the Gould-Nelson interpretation.210 Velocity and the Demand for Money
of a century, and also, of the rates of change of velocity, which can be
regarded as incorporating a sensitive adjustment for trend. Since the
statistical bases of the estimates are completely independent for the two
countries, and in each country, for money and income, errors of measure-
ment cannot account for the parallelism. Similarly, the obvious link
between the two countries—the balance of payments—seems more likely
to have produced inverse than parallel deviations in the two countries
between measured and desired velocity. A surplus for one country
tended to be accompanied by a deficit for the other country, so whatever
the effect of the balance of payments on velocity, it would be in opposite
directions in the two countries.
6 We know of no links that work in the
other direction.
Though we have treated the constant-velocity explanation and the
will-o'-the-wisp explanation as if they were opposite extremes, it is worth
noting that they have much in common. Insofar as variations in velocity
reflect errors of measurement—which they undoubtedly do to some
extent—such variations are consistent with both explanations. More-
over, as in all analysis involving a distinction between actual and desired,
or between permanent and transitory, it is generally impossible to sepa-
rate the part of the transitory component of the measured variable that is
attributable to errors of measurement from the part that is attributable to
other forces. Hence, at least some part of the variability of velocity
attributable to deviations between measured and desired velocity is also
consistent with both explanations.
Though a numerically constant velocity must be rejected as a full
explanation of the relation between money and income, it should not be
dismissed without recording how far it takes us. For any lengthy period,
equation (1)—the simplest and most rigid form of the constant-velocity
view—accounts for the great bulk of the variation in nominal income (if
the nominal quantity of money is regarded as exogenous and income as
adapting to the quantity of money) or in nominal quantity of money (if
nominal income is regarded as exogenous and the quantity of money as
adapting to income).
This is demonstrated in table 6.1. For the century as a whole, or the
more than eighty years excluding phases we have designated as war
6. Under fixed exchange rates, a surplus that arises from forces independent of the
nominal income of the country with the surplus would tend to lower measured velocity
below desired velocity in the interval between its effect on the quantity of money and the
effect of the changed quantity of money on income. If the surplus arose from an autonomous
rise in income that raised measured velocity above desired velocity (the sequence generally
envisioned in the monetary theory of the balance of payments), it would reduce measured
velocity to bring it back to desired velocity. In either case the surplus would be accompanied
by a decline in velocity, though in the first there is no reason to expect it to be preceded by a
rise in measured velocity; in the second there is.211 Velocity: A Numerical Constant?
phases, for the United States or the United Kingdom separately, or for
the two combined, equation (1), with Vset simply equal to its (geometric)
average value over the period and for the country or countries in ques-
tion, accounts for at least 94.5 percent of the variability in money or,
alternatively, income.
7 For three separate peacetime periods the corre-
sponding percentage exceeds 90 in nine out of eighteen observations, and
50 in fourteen out of eighteen observations.
8 The remaining four, one of
which is negative and the other three between 30 and 40, are all for the
briefest (eighteen years) and most turbulent subperiod—that between
the wars. The most striking result is for the two countries together, for
which the money and income observations have been pooled by the crude
device of simply converting figures in pounds sterling to dollars at the
ruling rate of exchange. Here, more than 95 percent of the variability is
accounted for by equation (1) except for the pre-World War I period,
where the sharp difference between the trends of velocity in the United
States and the United Kingdom reduces the percentage accounted for to
61 for income and 66 for money.
The major upward trends in income and money in both countries play
an important role in producing these results. The absence of wide differ-
7. Taking logs of equation (1), we have
(a) logM = log A: + logy.
If this equation were satisfied precisely, the variables could stand equally for observed or
predicted values. In fact, it will not be satisfied precisely, so we must distinguish between
observed and predicted values of M, k, and Y. Let the variables as written in equation (a)
stand for observed values, M and y for predicted values of M and Y, and log k for the mean
value of the observed values of log k (so its antilog is the geometric mean of the observed
values of k, and the reciprocal of its antilog, the geometric mean of the observed values of
velocity, or V). Then assuming Y exogenous,
(b) log M = log k + logy,
and the error of prediction is
(c) logM - logM = logM- logy- logk
(d) = logk - logA:.
Hence the root-mean-square error in the logs is equal to the standard deviation of log k,
and, since log k = -log V, is also the standard deviation of log V.
If M is assumed exogenous, we have
(e) log Y= logM -log k,
(f) log y-logy=logy-logM+logT
(g) = iogv-iogv,
so the root-mean-square error is again the standard deviation of log V. As noted in footnote
b of table 6.1, these estimates are maxima because neither log Y nor log M is measured
without error. See also footnote 28 of chapter 5.
8. For reasons which will become apparent later in this chapter, we shift our periodiza-
tion of nonwar phases for the rest of the book from the pre-World War 1/ post-World War I
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ences between the trend rates of growth in money and income is consis-
tent with equation (1), but it provides, as it were, only a single observa-
tion that receives a heavy weight in the percentages cited in the preceding
paragraph.
Yet even if we eliminate trends, equation (1) carries us a long way. As
noted, rates of change are a sensitive way of allowing for trends.
9 Equa-
tion (1) implies that the rate of change of money should equal the rate of
change of income, that is, that the rate of change of velocity should be
zero. Hence, the root-mean-square value of the rate of change of velocity
is an upper limit of the residual variability of rates of change of income or
money not accounted for by equation (1) (upper limit because it includes
errors of observation in both M and Y).
1
0
Using this estimate gives a minimum estimate of the fraction of varia-
tion accounted for by equation (1). As columns 7, 8, and 9 of table 6.1
show, this minimum estimate ranges from 46 to 69 percent for the full
period, including or excluding war phases. For other periods the result is
much more mixed, the minimum being negative in six out of eighteen
observations. Yet even for the subperiods the minimum percentage
exceeds 50 for seven of the twelve positive observations.
Nonetheless, there is much absolute variation remaining to be
accounted for after allowing for a constant velocity. The maximum
coefficient of variation of the residual variability in velocity ranges from 3
to 34 percent for various periods and countries. The maximum standard
deviation of the residual variability in rates of change varies from 0.4 to
9. Note that fitting a single straight-line trend to the logarithms of money and income
would give results intermediate between those for the level figures for the period as a whole
and the rate-of-change figures, since there are substantial differences between the single
trends and trends fitted to subperiods.
10. Differentiate equation (a) of footnote 7 above with respect to time:
(h) 1 dM = 1 dY
M dt Y dt'
or, in simpler notation,
(j) gM = gY-
Hence the rate of change of either variable is to be predicted from the rate of change of the
other by assuming them equal. Again distinguish predicted from observed, and we have that
the error in the predicted gM is
gM ~ gM = gM ~ gY = gk = ~gv-
Hence the root-mean-square of the rate of change of velocity is the root-mean-square error.
Note that the root-mean-square is not equal to the standard deviation of gv because gv may
not average zero. Rather,
As for levels, the root-mean-square value is the same for gM and gY, and both are maximum
errors because of errors of measurement.215 Velocity: A Numerical Constant?
3.1 percentage points. These are appreciable magnitudes, and we shall
have a highly imperfect understanding of monetary relations until we can
account for them.
1
1 Yet they are generally much less than the total
variation in levels or rates of change of money and income.
Table 6.1 makes it clear that a numerically constant velocity does not
deserve the sneering condescension that has become the conventional
stance of economists. It is an impressive first approximation that by
almost any measure accounts for a good deal more than half of the
phase-to-phase movements in money or income. Almost certainly,
measurement errors aside, it accounts for a far larger part of such move-
ments than the other extreme hypothesis—that velocity is a will-o'-the-
wisp reflecting independent changes in money and income. Yet, for most
of the period since the mid-1930s, the will-o'-the-wisp extreme has been
nearly the orthodox view among economists!
Our ultimate objective is an explanation of the behavior of velocity,
which is to say, of the quantity of money demanded, that takes account
simultaneously of all the variables affecting velocity. Nonetheless, we
believe that this ultimate objective is better approached indirectly, by
examining variables one or two at a time, than by what has become the
prevailing fashion in econometric work, the immediate computation of
multiple regressions including all variables that can reasonably be re-
garded as relevant. We believe that the indirect approach yields insights
that cannot be obtained from the more sweeping approach—that multi-
ple correlations with many variables are almost impossible to interpret
correctly unless they are backed by more intensive investigations of
smaller sets of variables. Accordingly, we shall proceed in the following
sections to consider variables one or two at a time, and reserve to section
6.7 estimating their simultaneous effect.
1
2
11. In light of the contrast that we and others have drawn between Keynesian and
quantity theories, it is fascinating that it was precisely with respect to this point that Keynes
made his famous remark about the long run. Having noted "that the quantity theory is often
stated" in a form in which velocity is a constant and output is determined independently of
the quantity of money, he went on to say, "Now 'in the long run' this is probably true. If,
after the American Civil War, the American dollar had been stabilised and denned by law at
10 per cent below its present value, it would be safe to assume that... [the price level] would
now be just 10 per cent greater than [it actually is].... But this long run is a misleading guide
to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too
useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past,
the ocean is flat again."
Like much of Keynes's own subsequent research, our monetary studies and those of other
scholars are an attempt to respond to the challenge stated so colorfully by Keynes. J. M.
Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform [1923], Royal Economic Society edition (London:
Macmillan, 1971), p. 65.
12. The indirect approach played a critical role in the formulation of the multiple
regressions that we calculate in section 6.7. At the same time, the partial results in sections216 Velocity and the Demand for Money
6.3 Effect of Financial Sophistication
The character of the financial system clearly affects velocity—indeed, it
affects what items we designate as money. The development of banks of
issue led students of money to add bank notes to coins and specie; the
development of government money issue, to add government fiduciary or
fiat currency; and the development of commercial banking, to add de-
posits, though with much disagreement about the kinds of deposits.
The financial structures of the United States and the United Kingdom
have had enough in common and have remained sufficiently constant for
the past century that we have found it feasible to use the same basic
definition of money for both countries and the whole period, with only
one minor exception.
1
3 However, while the general character of the
financial structures has remained the same, there have been substantial
changes in detail.
We concluded in chapter 5 (sec. 5.1.2) that the more rapid spread of
financial institutions in the United States than in the United Kingdom
after 1880 was probably the main reason for the near elimination by 1903
of the wide difference in velocity that prevailed in 1876-77—a difference
of 2.8 to 1. Clearly, we must somehow or other allow for this effect.
A full analysis would require identifying the features of financial orga-
nization that are most directly relevant to the demand for money and
measuring the separate influence of each—such features as number of
bank offices per capita, average minimum distance of a bank office from
residents in a specified area, fraction of the population having deposit
accounts, detailed costs of and returns from deposit accounts, variables
connected with the "quality " of deposits as judged by depositors, and so
on. More broadly, and particularly for countries other than the United




Such a full analysis, though it would be extremely illuminating, is
clearly beyond the scope of this study. In lieu thereof, we tried to see
whether a few simple variables (such as the deposit-currency ratio as a
proxy for the quality of deposits) could capture the major effects of the
6.4,6.5, and 6.6 are similar to the results from the final regressions. Hence the reader who is
interested primarily in the results and not their derivation may want to skip these sections.
This comment does not apply to section 6.3.
13. That exception is the exclusion of large negotiable certificates of deposit from the
United States money stock since 1961. See Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary Statistics, pp.
80-81.
14. A giro system was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1968. Although deposits
grew from £10 to £145 million in March 1975, they were only 0.5 percent of United Kingdom
commercial bank deposits at the later date. Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 15 (June
1975), table 11/1, p. 198.217 Effect of Financial Sophistication
spread of banking. These experiments were uniformly unsuccessful. We
have therefore resorted to a simple statistical expedient to correct United
States data for what, in chapter 5, we called the changing financial
sophistication of the United States relative to the United Kingdom.
1. On the basis of chart 5.5, showing velocity (or number of weeks of
income) in the United States and the United Kingdom, we conclude that
the change was largely completed by the year 1903.
2. We assume that the change affected the amount of money held and
therefore velocity by the same percentage each year from 1869 to 1903,
increasing money holdings and decreasing velocity each year by that
percentage, over and above any change that can be explained by other
variables.
3. One way we estimate the magnitude of the change is by using a
dummy variable. For statistical regressions in which the dependent vari-
able is the level of money or income or number of weeks of income held as
money, the dummy variable is taken equal to zero for the United States
phase centered on 1904.0 and later phases, and to the number of years
elapsing to 1903 for earlier phases. For regressions in which the depen-
dent variable is the rate of change of one of the indicated magnitudes, the
dummy variable is taken equal to zero for phases centered on 1906 and
later phases and equal to one for earlier phases.
4. Different regressions yield different estimates, yet all are within a
fairly narrow range. For one set of forty-eight regressions, for example,
for different periods, for the United States separately, and for the United
States and the United Kingdom, the estimates range from a low of .022 to
a high of .032; that is, increasing financial sophistication added between
2.2 and 3.0 percent per year to United States cash balances from 1876 to
1903. Accordingly, a second, and main, way we allow for the change in
financial sophistication is to construct an "adjusted" set of money esti-
mates for the United States for years before 1903 by raising the logarithm
of the actual money stock by a constant times the number of years
elapsing to 1903. The constant we have used is .0250; that is, we treat
increasing financial sophistication as adding 2.5 percent per year to
desired United States money balances from 1876 to 1903. The adjusted
rates of change of money, and of number of weeks of income held as
money, are therefore 2.5 percentage points lower than the unadjusted,
and the adjusted rates of change of velocity, 2.5 percentage points higher.
The effect is to eliminate most of the sharp early decline in velocity that is
so prominent a feature of the raw data.
The second way has the advantage that it keeps the allowance for
financial sophistication the same while other variables are altered. The
first way does not; in practice, other variables with definite trends, and
particularly steeper trends before 1903 than after, tend to absorb the218 Velocity and the Demand for Money
effect of financial sophistication in their coefficients.
1
5 Of course, this
consideration is not decisive. It may be that our adjustment for financial
sophistication is in fact absorbing part of the effect of these other vari-
ables. However, a variety of considerations lead us to conclude the
opposite.
Allowing for the changing degree of financial sophistication by adjust-
ing our money estimates has a substantial effect (table 6.2). As we have
interpreted it, this factor operates for 30 percent of the total period and
for three-quarters of the period before World War I. Yet for the United
States the adjustment reduces the variance of the aggregate level of
money by 16 percent, of real per capita money balances by 35 percent,
and of velocity by over 70 percent. To put it differently, table 6.1 showed
that constant velocity alone, with income treated as exogenous, accounts
for at least 96.1 percent of the variance of money and leaves a maximum
residual variation of 34.0 percent. For the adjusted money series, con-
stant velocity alone, with income again treated as exogenous, leaves a
residual variation of 18 percent (see table 6.3, line 1, col. 2). In conse-
quence, constant velocity plus the adjustment for financial sophistication
account for no less than 99 percent of the total variance of the initial
money series.
Put the other way around, treating money as exogenous, the initial
money series plus constant velocity account for at least 94.5 percent of the
variance of nominal income; substituting the adjusted money series
accounts for more than two-thirds of the residual variation, raising the
percentage of the variance accounted for to at least 98.5.
The effect of adjusting the money series is much the same for the
United States for the period excluding wars and is smaller, though still
very substantial indeed, for the United States plus the United Kingdom,
for either the total period or the period excluding wars. The effect is, of
course, even larger for the pre-World War I period, where the whole of
the adjustment is concentrated.
For rates of change, the adjustment has little effect on money—indeed,
the adjusted variance is somewhat higher than the unadjusted. The
unadjusted rates of change for the earlier period are not far from the
average for the period as a whole, thanks to the high rates of change
during World Wars I and II, so lowering them does not much affect the
standard deviation of the rates of change of money. If the war phases are
excluded, the adjustment does lower the variance. More important, the
adjustment reduces very appreciably the variation of per capita real
15. A specially clear example is provided by population. In one set of level regressions,
for example, the inclusion of population yields coefficients of the dummy variable ranging
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balances for both the United States and the United States and the United
Kingdom combined, for all periods considered.
Our adjustment for this factor treats it as no longer operative after
1903. That cannot be strictly valid. Many and sizable changes in financial
organization have occurred since then in both the United States and the
United Kingdom, particularly rapidly in recent decades. The apparent
effect of such changes on United States money-holding propensities
before 1903 raises the question whether they have not been an important
factor in both countries since then. That possibility adds to the desirabil-
ity of a full study of the effect of financial structure on the demand for
money. However, comparison of the variability of velocity, adjusted and
unadjusted, for different periods (table 6.3) suggests that the adjustment
we have made for the United States before 1903 is of much greater
magnitude than any further adjustment for this factor and renders the
data for the different periods relatively homogeneous. The adjusted
standard deviations for the periods including the pre-1903 period for the
United States are much more like those for the United States for subse-
quent periods—the whole period after 1903 (line 4 of table 6.3), the
interwar and post-World War II periods—than are the unadjusted stan-
dard deviations. In addition, the adjusted United States standard devia-
tions are much closer to the standard deviations for the United Kingdom
and for the two countries combined than the unadjusted—even though
some of the adjusted standard deviations do differ significantly both
between periods and countries.
Throughout the rest of the book, all references to United States money
figures, unless otherwise noted, are to the figures adjusted for the chang-




6.4 Effect of Real per Capita Income
6.4.1 Levels
Equation (1), corresponding to a constant numerical velocity, is en-
tirely in nominal terms. But it can be regarded as a special case of a more
general function that separates out real per capita income and money
from population and prices, for example, the function
(3) (_
16. To make sure that this procedure did not introduce a bias, for almost all our
calculations we made parallel estimates for the period after 1903, which we treated as
corresponding to equal financial sophistication in the two countries. The results conformed
so closely to those for the period as a whole based on adjusted observations that we have not
thought it worthwhile to include the results for that period in the tables that follow.222 Velocity and the Demand for Money
where N is population and P is the price level so that M/NP, which we
shall hereafter designate m, is real per capita cash balances and Y/NP,
which we shall designate as y, is real per capita income. Equation (1) is a
special case of equation (3) for a = p = 7 = 1.
In general, economists have tended to take p = 7 = 1, on the grounds,
for 7, that doubling all prices is equivalent simply to a change in units and
will therefore double nominal money demanded for double the nominal
income; for p, that the relevant function is for the individual economic
unit—household or business—and that doubling the number of units
would therefore double the nominal money demanded for double the
nominal income.
This reasoning is unobjectionable for different levels of prices, all
characterized by the same rate of change of prices (generally implicitly
taken to be zero). However, it takes time for a change from one level to
another to have its full effect. Hence the observed 7 may not equal unity
for a particular set of empirical observations. If it does not, it presumably
would reflect incomplete adjustment to price changes and therefore be
less than unity.
For population, the reasoning is unobjectionable if different sizes of
population are obtained by changing the unit of observation—going from
an individual state in the United States to a collection of states or to the
country as a whole. However, the effect of a change of population is not
at all clear for time-series observations for the same geographical area,
such as those with which we are primarily concerned. Larger population
means a higher density of population, which reduces the average distance
between persons and enables different patterns of transactions to de-
velop. It would be preferable to allow for such factors directly. However,
if that is not done, and population is used as a proxy, it may well be that
the observed value of (3 may not equal unity.
It is not clear a priori whether p will tend to exceed unity or be less than
unity: the greater ease of transactions in a denser market would lead to a
P less than unity; the greater division of labor and the more extensive
chain of intermediaries between the provision of factor services and the
ultimate consumer would lead to a p greater than unity.
For the rest of this section, we shall assume p = 7 = 1, but in the next
section we shall investigate this assumption to see whether it is indeed
supported by our data.
For real per capita income, there is no a priori reason to expect a to
equal unity or to have a constant value over time. Our earlier work has
led us to the empirical conclusion that a is generally greater than unity;
that is, that money is, in the terminology of consumption theory, a
"luxury" rather than a "necessity."
1
7 As we noted in chapter 5, the
17. M. Friedman, The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results,
Occasional Paper 68 (New York: NBER, 1959), reprinted in M. Friedman, The Optimum223 Effect of Real per Capita Income
comparisons with the United Kingdom persuade us that our earlier
estimates of the income elasticity of demand for real balances for the
United States may be too high, biased upward by our failure to allow for
changes in the degree of financial sophistication. Hence a reexamination
of this issue is clearly called for.
With (3 = 7 = 1, equation (3) can be rewritten
(4) m = ky
a .
If both sides are divided by y, we have an equation for desired number of
time units (e.g., weeks or years) of income held as money, or
(5) j = ky"-K
Taking the reciprocal of both sides gives
i
where V is velocity, turnovers per time unit.
If we take logarithms of equation (4), we have
(7) log m = log k + a log v.
This is the form in which we shall fit the equation statistically, both
because it gives a linear equation to fit and because the error term that
needs to be added to equation (7) to convert it into a stochastic function is
more nearly homoskedastic in the logarithms than in the original values.
The use of per capita real balances and per capita real income is correct
on economic grounds if (3 = 7 = 1. However, it does introduce a purely
statistical bias into equation (7) and similar equations. The basic data
consist of separate estimates of Y, M, N, and P. We then calculate m and
v from these estimates. The estimates of M, N, and P are statistically
independent—the estimates of M coming from the books of financial
institutions, of N from population censuses, and of P from price indexes
or national income statistics. There is some dependence between the
estimates of Y and P, since the price level we use is the price level implicit
in the calculation of national income at constant prices. However, the
national income calculations are mostly based on data for nominal in-
come, and real income in individual sectors is derived by dividing by an
independent price index. Hence, even for Y and P, the two magnitudes
can be regarded as largely independent.
Quantity of Money and Other Essays (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); M. Friedman and A. J.
Schwartz, "Money and Business Cycles," Review of Economics and Statistics, 45, no. 1, part
2, suppl. (February 1963): pp. 43-45, reprinted in M. Friedman, Optimum Quantity of
Money; Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, pp. 639, 679-82.224 Velocity and the Demand for Money
But if Y, M, N, and P are statistically independent magnitudes, m and y
are not, since
log m = log M — log N - log P
log y = log y - log N - log P.
On economic grounds, use of the same values of TV and P to calculate both
m and y is desirable, since in effect it enables us to impose the economic
restriction that p = -y = 1. It would raise no statistical problem if N and P
were measured without error. But obviously they are not. And errors of
measurement in N and P introduce common errors into m and y, since the
same numerical estimates are subtracted from log M and log Y in calculat-
ing log m and log y. These common errors tend to bias the statistical
estimate of a toward unity.
1
8 We know no simple way to estimate the size
of this bias, so we shall have to allow for it only qualitatively.
18. Express the logarithm of each variable as the sum of a "true" value and an error of
measurement, say.
log Y= (logY)* + eY
logNP = (logNP)* + eNP,
where an asterisk designates a true value and we have combined N and P because what
matters for our purpose is only their product. We then have
log m = (log m)* + eM - eNP
logy = (logy)* + eY- eNP.
Assume that eM, eY, and eNP are independent of the asterisked variables and of one
another, and that all variables are expressed as deviations from their means. We have two
"true" estimates of a, one from the regression of (log m)* on (log y)*, the other from the






where E stands for expected value, and, if the coefficients are positive, a*my<a*ym.
We have two corresponding statistical estimates of a, say
£[(log m) (log y)] E[(log m)* (log y)*] + o^
OLmy = =
Ojog y O(log y)*
"flog y)*
y)'225 Effect of Real per Capita Income
The Separate Countries
Chart 6.1 gives scatter diagrams of log m and log y, panel A for the
United States and panel B for the United Kingdom. In each panel three
lines are drawn through the point corresponding to the mean values of log
m and log y: a line with a slope of unity, which is the counterpart of
<*ym =





The statistical estimates differ from the true values because of errors in measuring (a) Y
and M and (b) NP.
With respect to (a), this is the standard regression effect, as can be seen by supposing NP
to be measured without error, so that ueNp = 0. We then have:
1+
°(log y)'
that is, the calculated regression coefficients will cover a wider range than the "true" ones.
To isolate the effect of (b), namely, errors in NP, suppose Y and M measured without







Both these expressions are of the form of weighted averages of the "true" coefficient and
unity, the weights being 1 and o^/o^iog>)• f°
r
 amy and 1 and <rlNp/E[(log m)*(log>')*] for
aym. Accordingly, the effect of errors in NP is to bias the computed coefficients toward unity
by comparison with the true coefficients. This conclusion remains valid when the assump-
tion that ae = (Te = 0 is dropped; that is, computed coefficients are biased toward unity
compared with hypothetical coefficients computed under the assumption that uNP = 0 but
aeM and crey are whatever they in fact are.
The possible magnitude of the regression effect can be judged by computing estimates of
a from both regressions and regarding these as upper and lower limits of the correct values.
There is no similar simple way that we know of to judge the size of the bias arising from the
errors in N and P, since that depends on the size of the measurement errors in Af and P
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Chart 6.1 Scatter diagram of levels of real per capita income and real per
























Income Elasticities and Correlation Coefficients, Calculated







































































Note: For United States plus United Kingdom, allowance is made for a difference in level
between the two countries after converting the United Kingdom figures from pounds to
dollars at the exchange rate of $4,862.
equation (1); and two regressions, one of log m on log v, the other of logy
on log ra, both computed from the phase average data for 1873 to 1975 for
the United States, and from 1874 to 1975 for the United Kingdom. The
slopes of these lines can be regarded as upper and lower estimates of a.
1
9
Table 6.4 gives, in columns 1 and 2, the numerical elasticities for these
regressions, and also for regressions for the period before World War I,
the interwar period, and the post-World War II period.
For the United States, for the period as a whole, the income elasticity is
clearly greater than unity. The line with a slope of unity is above most
observations for income and money below the mean and below most
observations for income and money above the mean (indeed there are
only three observations that do not conform to this pattern). Both regres-
sions are steeper than the line with unit slope.
The points that are most out of line are for the 1930s, the World War II
years, and the immediate post-World War II years. These indicate much
19. See the preceding note.228 Velocity and the Demand for Money
larger money holdings (i.e., lower velocity) than the others. We are
inclined to attribute this result to the effects of the great contraction of
1929-33 and the war. Declining prices during the contraction meant that
money balances had a substantial positive yield, and great uncertainty
raised desired liquidity. These effects were partly offset by bank failures,
which lowered the "quality" of deposits. The uncertainty lasted long after
the contraction itself and was then reinforced by the war; in addition,
during the war, the unavailability of goods reinforced uncertainty in
raising desired money balances.
These discrepancies are reflected in the much less satisfactory results
for the interwar and postwar periods than for the period as a whole or the
pre-World War I period. The correlation for the interwar period is close
to zero, and the elasticities for the postwar period are far lower than for
the period as a whole.
The United Kingdom results differ in two respects. First, only one of
the regression lines has a slope greater than unity. The scatter diagram as
a whole does not suggest an elasticity greater than unity: about half the
points for incomes below the mean are above the line with a slope of
unity, and about the same fraction of points for incomes above the mean
are below the line. Second, the scatter is much looser, with a correlation
coefficient of .87, compared with .98 for the United States.
However, there are also some similarities, most strikingly the division
of the points into two sets, one at a higher level than the other. The points
at the higher level (circled in the charts) include the same period as those
for the United States (1939-54) and in addition all the phases for the
1920s from 1921 on.
2
0 The additional phases are no less significant than
the common ones. The United Kingdom's time of serious economic
trouble started in the early 1920s and recovery began in 1932, before the
Great Contraction ended in the United States. The forces we adduced to
explain the discrepant points for the United States—namely, price defla-
tion, uncertainty arising out of serious cyclical fluctuation reinforced by
the outbreak of war, and the unavailability of goods during the war—all
operated at least as strongly in the United Kingdom as in the United
States but started nearly a decade earlier. It therefore supports this
interpretation that higher-level-points for the United Kingdom span a
period beginning earlier but ending at roughly the same date as the
analogous United States points.
A second similarity between the two countries came to light when we
studied the relations between rates of change (see sec. 6.4.2), namely, an
immediate postwar adjustment that produced idiosyncratic rates of
change after World War I and World War II in both the United States and
the United Kingdom—in both countries, in opposite directions after the
20. In addition, because of the difference in reference dates, the final phase at the higher
level ends in 1955 rather than 1954.229 Effect of Real per Capita Income
two wars but by roughly the same amount in the two countries. We had
missed these perturbations when we first studied the level data because
even a sizable deviation in a rate of change for a phase or two produces
only a small effect on the levels.
However, once alerted to them, it is easy to see their effect. For the
United States for World War I they are reflected in a substantial deviation
of the phase centered on 1919 (designated by the lowest of the three
uncircled *'s) below the lower of the two regression lines in chart 6.1,
panel A. Indeed, it deviates more from the line than all but one other
observation (for the phase centered on 1884). The level of the phase
centered on 1920 is also below the line (the second lowest of the three
uncircled *'s), the level of the phase centered on 1921 (the third of the
uncircled *'s) is nearly on the line. The postwar adjustment reaction
apparently carried too far, bringing the phase level centered on 1922.5
well above the line. The same pattern is repeated, but in the other
direction, for World War II. The 1947.5 point is well above the upper line
(the highest of the circled *'s marked on the chart), the largest deviation
with one exception in the upper set. The 1949 point (the second highest
circled *) is a trifle above the line, that for the 1952 phase (the third of the
circled *'s) well below.
For the United Kingdom a similar, though initially less clear, pattern is
present after World War I—the tendency to overshoot carrying the
observations into the beginning of the period we isolated as reflecting an
upward shift in liquidity. After World War II, the pattern of points for the
United Kingdom around the upper regression line in chart 6.1, panel B is
almost identical with that for the United States, except it comes later in
time. The phase centered on 1949 (the highest circled * marked on the
chart) is well above the line, with 1952, 1954, and 1957 moving toward
and then below it, and the 1957 phase reflecting both the overshooting
and the end of high liquidity preferences.
We shall refer to these postwar perturbations as the postwar shift and
to the upward shift in liquidity preference as the demand shift.
When we analyze the effect of other variables influencing the quantity
of money demanded later in this chapter, we shall see whether their
fluctuations are such as to account for the two shifts: the demand shift and
the postwar shift. In the meantime, in order to continue examining the
effect of per capita real income by itself, we shall use the device of
introducing two shift variables.
To allow for the apparent increase in liquidity preference in the inter-
war, war, and early postwar periods, we introduce a dummy variable that
has the value of one for the phases in the upper cluster, of zero for the
other phases. This procedure is equivalent to fitting separate regressions
to the two clusters of points but imposing the requirement that they have
the same slope, that is, income elasticity.230 Velocity and the Demand for Money
To allow for the postwar shift, we also introduce a dummy variable for
the affected phases, but this one equal in absolute value to the time span
beteen the midpont of the affected phase and the midpoint of the first
normal postwar phase, and negative after World War I, positive after
World War II. The reason, as explained below in section 6.4.2, is that we
interpret the adjustment as reflecting a maximum change in the rate of




Consistent with our visual impression, the postwar adjustment dummy
produces an appreciable minor improvement in results for the level
equations, if a less substantial improvement than for the rate of change
equations or than the demand shift dummy does for the level equations.
2
2
Panels A and B of chart 6.2 repeat the scatters from chart 6.1 and add two
pairs of parallel lines, one pair corresponding to the regression of log m
on log v, the other to the regression of log v on log m, the difference
between the lines in each pair reflecting the demand shift and also
allowing for the postwar readjustment.
The improvement in fit is striking. Indeed, for the United States the
correlation is so high that the log m on log v and log v on log m regressions
are difficult to distinguish on a chart the size of chart 6.2, panel A.
The imposition of a common income elasticity on the two clusters
seems to do no serious violence to the observed data. The larger number
and wider scatter of observations in the lower cluster means that that
cluster largely determines the numerical size of the slope. Yet even for
the upper cluster the slope seems appropriate—though there is some
indication for the United Kingdom that a slightly steeper slope would be
preferable.
The remarkable feature of these charts is how closely a single pattern
fits such widely separated observations as those before World War I and
after World War II. Allowance for the demand and postwar shifts drasti-
cally reduces the differences between regressions for the period before
World War I, when no shift variables are used, and similar regressions for
the period thereafter, including shift variables. Once the shift variables
are included, little is gained by distinguishing war phases from the other
phases, or by any of the other subgroups we have used.
2
3
21. See below, following equation (8), for a more detailed listing of the values of the
dummy variables.
22. The f-value for the coefficient of the postwar adjustment dummy is 2.8 for the United
States, 3.6 for the United Kingdom, and 2.1 for the two countries combined, compared with
corresponding f-values for the demand shift dummy of 9.7,10.8, and 9.9. The numerical size
of the estimated coefficient of the postwar adjustment dummy is about 2 percent per year for
both the United States and the United Kingdom, about 1.5 percent per year for the two
countries combined, which is less than one-third of the estimate derived from the rate of
change data.
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Chart 6.2 Scatter diagram of levels of real per capita income and real per
capita money and regression lines isolating effect of demand
shift.232 Velocity and the Demand for Money
Table 6.5 Effect of Allowing for Postwar Adjustment and Shift Dummies









Mean Sum of Squared Residuals
United States
Within first period (22) .0038 .0028
Within second period (27)(26)
b .0196 .0031 .0058 .0020
Two periods combined .0127 .0034 .0045 .0024
Between two periods .1254 .0222 .0443 .0048
United Kingdom
Within first period (12)











F Values and Significance of Difference
United States






























aAnd number of observations, not degrees of freedom.
bNumber of observations one greater for simple regressions than for multiple regressions.
*Significant at .05 level.
**Significant at .01 or more stringent level.
Table 6.5 summarizes the effect of allowing for the demand and post-
war shift dummies on the difference between the period through 1918
(first period) and the period thereafter (second period) with respect to
the residual variances within the two periods and also the regression
equations for the two periods. We present these calculations for the
simple regression equations that, aside from the dummies, include only
per capita real money balances and per capita real income and also for the
multiple regression equations that we finally settle on in section 6.7,
which include in addition two independent variables measuring the yield
on alternative assets.
The residual variance within the second period is reduced sharply by
allowing for the dummies, by between 45 percent and 84 percent. For the
subperiods as well as for the period as a whole. However, we have found them for the most
part to add so little to the single calculation including one or more shift variables that it has
not seemed worth including them in the tables.233 Effect of Real per Capita Income
United States, the resulting residual variance for the second period does
not differ significantly from that for the first: the set of data becomes
homogeneous in that respect. For the United Kingdom there remains a
significant difference, which reflects the abnormally low variance for the
first period, in our opinion a statistical artifact arising from the extensive
interpolation entering into the early United Kingdom data.
The variance of the difference between the two periods is reduced even
more sharply, by between 78 and 97 percent. For the United States, the
difference between the two periods remains statistically significant for the
simple regression but not the multiple—apparently the time difference
reflects primarily differences in average interest rates. For the United
Kingdom the situation is reversed: there is no significant difference for
the simple regression; there is for the multiple. However, in light of the
major reduction in both the variance between periods and the F values,
and our doubts about the statistical validity of the variance within the first
period, we do not regard this one result as contradicting the validity of
treating the whole period as homogeneous after allowing for the two
shifts.
The main difference between the two countries is the steeper slope of
the regression for the United States than for the United Kingdom—a
higher than unit elasticity for the United States, a lower than unit elastic-
ity for the United Kingdom.
Table 6.6 summarizes the numerical effect of allowing for the demand
and postwar shifts. Remarkably, the size of both shifts is almost identical
in the two countries. For the demand shift, desired money balances were
apparently raised by about 30 percent at each level of per capita income
by the factors associated with Depression and its aftermath and World
War II. For the postwar shift, desired money balances were lowered after
World War I and raised after World War II by the limited rate at which
balances readjusted from their abnormal wartime levels to peacetime
levels. The percentage discrepancy on this account narrowed at a rate
equal to roughly two percentage points per year; that is, the percentage
discrepancy was equal in absolute value to twice the time interval be-
tween each of the relevant phases and the first postwar phase we treated
as normal (phases centered on 1922.5 and 1954.0 for the United States
and on 1923.0 and 1957.0 for the United Kingdom).
The estimated income elasticity is 1.2 for the United States, about 0.8
for the United Kingdom. This difference raises a real puzzle. Does it
reflect a fundamental difference between the two countries in the re-
sponse of the quantity of money demanded to a change in real income?
Or may it be a disguised reflection of a differential behavior in the two
countries of other variables affecting the quantity of money demanded?
We shall pursue that question in the later sections of this chapter. Here
we may only note that the difference in computed elasticities is large©'•* 00
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enough, and the residual variation small enough, so that the elasticity




The constant velocity assumption of section 6.2 is equivalent to assum-
ing an elasticity of unity between money and income. In view of the
closeness of the estimated elasticities to unity, it is not surprising that
24. The relevant analysis of variance is as shown in table 6.N.I.
The difference in slope and in level are highly significant, the difference in shifts is not.
Similarly, both the common demand shift and the postwar shift are highly significant, and of
course the common slope is highly significant.
It should be noted that the partition of the sums of squares among the individual degrees
of freedom is not invariant to the order in which the various effects are allowed for. We have
generally followed the principle of allowing for the effects in the order of their significance,
as indicated by f-values.
Table 6.N.1 Analysis of Variance of Differences between Demand for Money



































































aThe total sum of squares does not equal the sum of within country sums because of the need
to allow for the effect of unequal weighting of observations. The mean squares within
parentheses are estimates of the common mean square after adjustment for difference of
weights. The common mean is the weighted average of the parenthetical figures, the weights
being the number of degrees of freedom. The two parenthetical mean squares do not differ
at a .05 level.
For 1 and 78 degrees of freedom, .05 F value is 4.0; .01 F value, 7.0; .001 F value, 11.8.
For 2 and 78 degrees of freedom, the corresponding F values are 3.1, 4.9, and 7.6.237 Effect of Real per Capita Income
allowing for a constant elasticity instead of an elasticity of unity produces
only a rather small reduction in the computed standard error of estimate
for either real per capita money, with real per capita income taken as
exogenous, or real per capita income, with real per capita money taken as
exogenous (compare lines 8 and 9 and 13 and 14 in table 6.6). For reasons
explained in chapter 5, these two standard errors cannot both be simul-
taneously valid measures of the variation in each of the variables inde-
pendent of the variation in the other, because each assumes that the other
variable is perfectly known. The entries in lines 9 and 14 of table 6.6, like
the entries in lines 8 and 13, are therefore to be regarded as estimates of
the maximum residual standard error. Simultaneously valid estimates of
the independent variation in each variable would necessarily be lower.
Allowing for the demand and postwar shifts in liquidity preference in
three out of four cases reduces the maximum residual standard error
more drastically than allowing for the difference between constant elas-
ticity and constant velocity; and allowing for both the shifts and the
differences between constant elasticity and constant velocity does even
better. Allowing for the shifts generally enhances the value of substitut-
ing constant elasticity for constant velocity. Together the two roughly cut
the standard error in half and in addition, for real per capita money,
though not income, bring the standard errors for the United States and
the United Kingdom closer together. All these residual standard errors
are below 10 percent—and these continue to be maximum estimates.
The constant velocity standard errors are constrained to be the same
for money and income. For the United States, all of the rest are higher for
money than for income, but for the United Kingdom they are higher for
income than for money. The reason is linked to an elasticity higher than
unity for the United States and lower than unity for the United Kingdom.
The total variability of money is higher in the United States than the total
variability of income—which helps to produce the higher than unit
elasticity.
2
5 The reverse is the case in the United Kingdom, which helps to
produce the lower than unit elasticity. But the usual convention regards
the same fraction of the variance of each variable as "accounted for" by
the regression, namely the square of the correlation coefficient given in
line 5 of table 6.6. As a result, if the initial standard error is higher (or
lower) for log m than for log y, so also must be the residual standard
error. If, as we suspect, pure errors of measurement are higher for
income than for money, then the "correct" fraction of variance
accounted for may well be higher for money than for income, which
25. Because the lower limit is r ^p- and the upper limit, 77jp Since r is necessarily less
than unity,
 am >
 ay is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the lower limit to exceed
unity, and a sufficient but not necessary condition for the upper limit to do so.238 Velocity and the Demand for Money
might well reverse the relation now shown in table 6.6 for the United
States and increase the difference for the United Kingdom. We saw in the
preceding chapter that the standard deviation of deviations about trend
was higher for income than for money, and we shall see in the next section
that the standard deviation of rates of change is also higher for income
than for money, both of which suggest that the purely random component
is higher for income than for money and that table 6.6 may show the
opposite for the United States solely because of a statistical convention.
The figures in table 6.6 overstate the case for constant elasticity as
compared with constant velocity. We are here dealing with per capita real
magnitudes. These have lower variability than the nominal aggregates. A
constant velocity (i.e., unit elasticity) demand function would enable us
to predict total income from total money, if we assume money exoge-
nous, or total money from total income, if we assume income exogenous.
The constant elasticity per capita real demand function would not; we
would need to know in addition what is happening to prices and popula-
tion. Additional "explanation" is therefore bought at the expense of
requiring more information.
The Two Countries Combined
Despite the statistically significant difference between the income elas-
ticities for the United States and the United Kingdom derived from the
regressions that allow for the demand and postwar shifts, the similarity of
the regressions in other respects and the small magnitude of the elasticity
difference suggest that it may be worth getting a single estimate by
combining the data for the two countries, if only to explore some of the
problems raised by such a combination.
We cannot combine the data directly, because the data for the United
States are in dollars and those for the United Kingdom are in pounds
sterling. One way to combine the data is to convert the United Kingdom
figures to dollars at the exchange rate ($4,862) ruling in 1929 (the year
that was the base for the price indexes used to estimate real money
balances). That is the way we have combined them to get the standard
deviations for the two countries in lines 7 and 12 of table 6.6. However, it
is far from clear that the market rate of exchange is the relevant one for
the purpose of calculating a single regression.
Both for this reason and also to allow for a possible difference in the
level of money demand between the two countries, we include in all
regressions for the two countries combined a dummy variable (Z) distin-
guishing the United Kingdom from the United States. With this addition
plus dummy variables to allow for the demand (S) and postwar (W) shifts,
equation (7) becomes:239 Effect of Real per Capita Income
(8) log m = log k + a log y + \xW + X2S + \3Z ,
where W= —Tt for the phases centered on 1919, 1920, and
1921 for the United States and the United
Kingdom
+ Tt for the phases centered on 1947.5,1949, and
1951.5 for the United States and 1949,1952,
and 1954 for the United Kingdom
0 for all other phases
S= 1 for the phases from 1929 to 1954 in the
United States and from 1921 to 1955 in the
United Kingdom
0 for all other phases
Z = 1 if the observation is for the United Kingdom
0 if the observation is for the United States
and where Tt = time interval between the center of phase
i and the center of the first postwar phase treated as
normal (1922.5 and 1954.0 for the United States, and
1923.0 and 1957.0 for the United Kingdom.).
The parameter X3 encompasses two effects: a difference in level pro-
duced by the exchange rate required to convert pounds to dollars and any
difference in the level of money demand for the two countries at that
exchange rate. To demonstrate, distinguish by subscripts the observa-
tions for the United States and the United Kingdom. Let EX be the rate
of exchange expressed in number of dollars per pound; let the original
observations for the United States be in dollars and for the United
Kingdom in pounds; and assume that a, \lf and \2
 ar
e the same for the
two countries. We then have
(9) log mm = log k^ + a log yus + K1W + K2S
(10) log EXmuk = log kuk + a log EXyuk + XxW + \2S
(11) or log muk = log kuk + (a -1) log EX + a log yuk
+ \x W + \2S
(12) or log muk = log km + a log yuk + ktW + \2S + (log kuk - log kj) + (a -1) log EX.
If we now fit the combined data for the United States and the United
Kingdom with equation (8), keeping the United States data in dollars and
the United Kingdom data in pounds, it is clear that
(13) X3 = (log kuk - log km) + (a -1) log EX.240 Velocity and the Demand for Money
The first term reflects any difference in the level of money demand
between the two countries at the exchange rate of EX; the second reflects
the difference in apparent level arising from the exchange rate.
2
6 If a = 1,
that is, income elasticity is unity, then no difference in apparent level
arises from the exchange rate: velocity is then a constant and hence is
independent of the level of income and equally of the monetary units in
which income and money are expressed, provided the same rate of
exchange is used for both money and income, which is why this problem
did not arise in section 6.2, where we analyzed constant velocity.
If a =£ 1, it is impossible to decompose the computed value of k3 into its
two parts without a further assumption. (1) If we assume that the first
term is zero, that is, that there is no difference in level, we can use
equation (13) to estimate the implied value of EX, that is, the exchange
rate that would produce identical relations for the United States and the
United Kingdom (given that the slopes or elasticities and the size of the
shifts are forced to be identical and that the same exchange rate is used for
money and income). We shall consider later how to interpret such an
implicit exchange rate. (2) Alternatively, if we assume a particular value
for EX, say $4,862, which was the market value in 1929, the base year for
both the United States and United Kingdom real magnitudes, we can use
equation (13) to estimate the difference in level between the United
States and the United Kingdom relations. The result will of course be
precisely the same as if we had calculated equation (8), using United
Kingdom figures converted to dollars at that exchange rate.
2
7
The entries in table 6.4 for the United States and United Kingdom
combined were calculated using this dummy variable procedure but not
allowing for the shifts (i.e., treating Xx and X2
 a
s zero). The entries in table
6.6 for the two countries combined were calculated the same way except
allowing for the shifts (i.e., from equation 8). They gave us estimates of
the income elasticity and of the upward shifts that are free from any
assumption about the exchange rate that is appropriate or about the size
of the constant terms in equations (9) and (10).
26. If, instead of computing regression (8) from United States figures in dollars and
United Kingdom figures in pounds, we were to use United Kingdom figures converted to
dollars at the exchange rate EX', equation (13) would become:
(13') X3 = (log kuk - log km) + (a - l)(log EX - log EX')
In effect, using pound figures is equivalent to using an EX' — 1, in which case equation (13')
reduces to equation (13). Note that in equation (13') kuk implicitly gives the level of the
United Kingdom relation in dollars at the exchange rate of EX, not EX', just as it does in
equation (13).
27. See preceding note.241 Effect of Real per Capita Income
For the 1929 market exchange rate of $4,862, the difference in level
between the United States and the United Kingdom is 11 to 13 percent
(line 2c of table 6.6). That is, at each level of real income per capita, real
balances per capita tend, according to this combined estimate, to be 11 to
13 percent higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States.
Because the average elasticity (1.07-1.12) is so close to unity, it is clear
that this estimate will not be highly sensitive to the precise exchange rate
used to convert United Kingdom figures to dollars. For example, for
reasons discussed in Appendix A to this chapter (sec. 6.8), the purchasing
power parity exchange rate has a strong claim to be the relevant exchange
rate to use in combining the data. An estimate of the purchasing power
parity rate for various years can be constructed from the most recent
independent estimate for 1970. That estimate sets it at $5.50 for 1929.
2
8 At
this exchange rate, the difference in level, as computed from equation
(13), would have been 10 to 12 percent instead of 11 to 13 percent.
Clearly, no plausible adjustment of the market exchange rate can account
for the difference in level.
A far more serious problem about the estimated difference in level
arises from neglecting the effect of the significant difference in income
elasticity between the two countries. This problem is illustrated by chart
6.3, which plots for the two countries the money on income regressions
from equation (8)—these are the two parallel lines—and the regressions
calculated for each country separately from the same equation, eliminat-
ing, of course, the term Z.
2
9 In all cases the regressions are for values of
the shift dummy variables (W and 5) set equal to zero (i.e., they corre-
spond to the lower of the two parallel lines in chart 6.2).
The constraint to a common elasticity imposed by equation (8) fitted to
pooled data for the two countries forces parallelism between the resulting
lines for the separate countries and so gives a single estimate for the
difference between the two countries for all levels of income—the 11 to
13 percent difference recorded in line 2c of table 6.6. But this parallelism
clearly misrepresents the data—as the other two lines on the chart show.
Because the United States line has a higher elasticity than the United
Kingdom line, it starts below and ends above the United Kingdom line.
At the roughly equal per capita income in the two countries at the
beginning of our period (1876 or 1877), the United Kingdom regression
gives a level of real per capita money 40 percent higher than does the
United States regression. A century later, at the prevailing United King-
dom income, the United Kingdom level is 13 percent below the United
States; at the prevailing United States income, now much higher than in
28. See appendix to this chapter, section 6.8.
29. For simplicity, we show only the money on income regressions. Because of the high
correlations, the income on money regressions differ only trivially.242 Velocity and the Demand for Money
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for United States and United Kingdom, elasticities different
and constrained to be equal, eliminating common shift.
the United Kingdom, 30 percent. The single estimate of 11 percent is
implicitly an average of these very different figures.
This chart puts a strong spotlight on the puzzle referred to above—
Why the difference in elasticities? Why, at a comparable level of real
income early in the century we cover, should United Kingdom real
balances per capita have averaged close to 40 percent higher than United
States balances, but at the end of the century, 13 to 30 percent lower?
Does this difference reflect a basic discrepancy between the countries in
the effect of higher real income, other major variables held constant? Or
does it reflect the effect of a differential change between the two countries
in those variables?243 Effect of Real per Capita Income
Any ambiguity about the exchange rate to use in pooling the data for
the two countries has little to offer to the explanation of the differences
we have found between the two countries. At most the use of a wrong
exchange rate could help explain the difference in average level; it would
contribute nothing to explaining the difference in slopes, which is derived
from data for each country separately. As a result we have relegated a full
examination of the problem of the exchange rate to use in pooling the
data to Appendix A of this chapter (sec. 6.8).
Summary of Results for Levels of Money and Income
The results for the levels of real money per capita are fairly straightfor-
ward. For the whole century we cover, and for each country separately,
the elasticity of real money per capita with respect to real income per
capita appears to be a constant, numerically greater than unity (about
1.2) for the United States, less than unity (about 0.81) for the United
Kingdom. There appears to have been a single upward shift in liquidity
preference of about the same size (30 percent) in both countries, con-
nected with economic depression and its aftermath and World War II and
its aftermath. We estimate that the shift spanned the years 1929 to 1954 in
the United States and 1921 to 1955 in the United Kingdom. There
appears also to have been a postwar readjustment to bring demand back
to its desired level—after the particularly low level of money demand
during World War I and the high level during World War II—that was
also of the same size in both countries. The postwar adjustment was less
important in both size and duration than the demand shift. Together,
constant elasticity plus the shifts account for at least 99 percent of the
variation in real per capita money for the United States, if real per capita
income is taken as exogenous, and 98 percent for the United Kingdom;
and for 99 and 98 percent for the United States and the United Kingdom,
respectively, of the variation in real per capita income, if real per capita
money is taken as exogenous. The maximum residual standard error is
less than 6.5 percent for money for the United States, 6.3 percent for the
United Kingdom, less than 5.4 percent for income for the United States,
and 7.8 percent for the United Kingdom.
We have constructed a single equation for the two countries, constrain-
ing the elasticities to be equal. The calculated common elasticity is about
1.1, and the estimated level of real per capita money for given real capita
income is about 11 to 13 percent higher in the United Kingdom than in the
United States. However, these estimates deserve little confidence be-
cause of the difference between the two countries in elasticity, which
means that for real incomes as low as those in the early part of the period,
United Kingdom real per capita money for given real per capita income is
something like 40 percent higher than in the United States, and for levels
of real income as high as those at the end of the period, some 13 to 30
percent lower.244 Velocity and the Demand for Money
This difference in elasticity is the chief puzzle. Moreover, since errors
in population and prices bias these estimates toward unity, unbiased
estimates would be higher for the United States and lower for the United
Kingdom, giving a still larger difference to explain.
A major task for later sections of this chapter is to see whether changes
over time in the other variables that we explore can account for the
upward shift in both countries, and whether differential changes over
time in these other variables for the two countries can account for the
difference in elasticity.
6.4.2 Rates of Change
The situation is somewhat different for rates of change of real per
capita money and real per capita income, as is clear from chart 6.4, panels
A and B, which gives scatter diagrams for rates of change like those in
chart 6.1, panels A and B, for levels.
If we differentiate equation (7) with respect to time, we have
(14) 1 dm = 1 dy
m dt y dt
or
(15) gm = a gy ,
where g designates the rate of change of the variable designated by the
subscript.
A value of a = 1 corresponds to a constant velocity. Hence, if velocity
is constant,
(16) gm=gy ,
that is, money and income change at the same rate. The center line in
each graph corresponds to equation (16). The other two lines are esti-
mates of equation (15) obtained by regressing gm on gy and gy on gm, forcing the constant term to be zero. The computed values of a are given
in table 6.7.
Clearly the scatters are very loose—more so for the United Kingdom
than for the United States. The two limiting regressions are reasonably
close together for the United States, a good deal farther apart for the
United Kingdom.
This impression is confirmed by table 6.7. Columns 1,2, and 3 are for
equation (15). The correlations are clearly much lower than for the
levels, but still most are appreciable. The limits on the income elasticity
are much wider apart, but in general they include the narrower range in
tables 6.4 and 6.6. However, much of the correlation, especially for the
United Kingdom, comes from a common trend, as can be seen from
columns 4, 5, and 6, which are for equation (15) modified by adding a
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(17) gm = K + agy.
Equation (17) is obtained by adding the term KT, with T for time, to
equation (7) and then differentiating with respect to time, which is why
we speak of it as allowing for a trend. The correlations for the United
States in this part of the table are still respectable, but for the United
Kingdom they are close to zero except for the pre-World War I period.
To some extent these rather unsatisfactory results simply reflect the
statistical characteristics of our data. Our rates of change are comparable
to first differences between equally spaced data, differing only in being
based on observations that are unequally spaced and on three rather than
two observations. Correlations between first differences typically tend to
be much lower than between original values because the random compo-
nent plays so much larger a role compared with the systematic compo-
nent. Similarly, we would expect the correlations between the rates of
change to be much lower than between the levels, especially given the
strong secular trends in our variables. On this ground the lower but still
respectable correlations for the United States are fully in accord with
expectations. However, the sharp drop in the United Kingdom correla-
tions, to a level that does not differ from zero by an amount that is
statistically significant, is disturbing.
The contrast between the prewar period for the United Kingdom and
the other periods gives a clue to the results for the latter. For both the
United States and the United Kingdom, the results for periods other than
the prewar period are distorted by two phenomena: (1) immediate post-
war perturbations, which account for the most extreme observations for
both the United States and the United Kingdom, and (2) the upward shift
in liquidity preference discussed in the preceding section.
1. The points in chart 6.4, panels A and B marked * are the relevant
postwar phases centered on 1920 and 1921 for both countries after World
War I; on 1949 and 1951.5 for the United States; and 1952 and 1954 for
the United Kingdom after World War II. In both countries the two sets of
postwar points are extreme, though in opposite directions: the rate of
growth of real per capita money is unusually high after World War I and
unusually low after World War II. The opposite directions are the coun-
terpart of the difference between the two wars that we discussed earlier
(sec. 5.2): during World War I velocity rose, so after the war real money
balances rose sharply to restore them to their usual relation to real
income; during World War II velocity fell, so after the war real money
balances had to fall sharply to restore the usual relation.
Two other features stand out. First, the deviations in the opposite
directions from the central line are of roughly the same magnitude both
for the two wars and for the two countries. At the risk of reading more
into the data than may be there, this curious and, at least to us, unex-248 Velocity and the Demand for Money
pected result suggests that there may be a fairly constant maximum rate at
which money holders are willing, under the kind of conditions prevailing
at the end of the two wars, to readjust their money holdings from one
desired level to another. Second, the postwar readjustment comes at the
same time in the two countries after World War I but later in the United
Kingdom after World War II. This again is a familiar phenomenon that
we have referred to before.
2. Because our rates of change are calculated from three phase levels,
the upward shift in liquidity preference isolated in our examination of
levels affects two rates of change at the onset and two at its termination.
These observations are circled in chart 6.4. For the United States, the
circled observations do not overlap the ones marked *. For the United
Kingdom, because the upward shift came earlier and the post-World War
II readjustment later, there is an overlap, so that two observations are
both *'s and circled.
The upward shift tends to make the rate of change of real per capita
money unusually high when it began and unusually low when it ended.
Seven out of eight circled points clearly conform to that expectation; the
eighth, the United Kingdom one for 1923, is somewhat ambiguous,
falling between the two regressions.
To estimate the quantitative effect of allowing for these two phe-
nomena, we have added two dummy variables to equations (15) and (17),




gm = agy + Xi
gm = K + agy
\2Sg
+1 for the phases centered on 1920 and 1921 for the
United States and the United Kingdom
-1 for the phases centered on 1949 and 1951.5 for the
United States and 1952 and 1954 for the United
Kingdom
0 for all other phases
= «+ Tg. for the phases centered on 1928.5 and 1931 for the
United States and 1921 and 1923 for the United
Kingdom
- Tg. for the phases centered on 1954 and 1956 for the
United States and 1954 and 1957 for the United
Kingdom
0 for all other phases
where Tg. is the time interval between the centered dates of phase i + 1
and phase i — 1. Note that Wg and Sg and Tg. are equivalent to the time
derivative of the corresponding variables, W, S, and Tt for levels.249 Effect of Real per Capita Income
The first dummy variable, Wg, allows for the postwar readjustment, the
second, Sg, for the upward shift. This way of allowing for these phe-
nomena constrains the postwar readjustment to have the same effect on
the rate of change for each of the four phases involved, and the upward
demand shift to have the same effect on the product of the rate of change
and time duration for each of the four phases involved. For Wg, that
constraint reflects the hypothesis that there is a maximum per-year desir-
able rate of readjustment of deficient or excessive money balances; for Sg
it reflects our earlier conclusion that the level figures could be approxi-
mated by two parallel constant elasticity functions. For each of the four
rate of change observations affected by the shift, the size of the step is the
same, but since the period over which the adjustment occurs depends on
the interval between the preceding and following phases, that implies a
constant product of time interval and change in the rate of change.
The effect of introducing these dummy variables is summarized in table
6.8. These results are much more satisfactory than those in table 6.7.
Though the correlations between rates of change after allowing for shifts
are understandably still much lower than between levels, they are all
positive and most differ significantly from zero. More important, the
ranges of the income elasticities are not inconsistent with the ranges
derived from the levels. The postwar shift plays a much larger role, and
the demand shift a smaller role, for rates of change than for levels, but
again the size of the shifts is about the same for the United States and the
United Kingdom. The one important difference from the levels is that
there is no clear difference between United Kingdom and United States
income elasticities—but that may reflect simply the much lower correla-
tion for rates of change and hence the wider limits on the estimated
elasticity.
As for levels, the inclusion of the shift variables seems to make the data
homogeneous for the different periods. There is no significant difference
between the computed regressions for the pre-World War I period, for
which dummies are irrelevant, and the rest of the period, if dummies are
included.
3
0 Neither is there a significant difference between the United
States and the United Kingdom regressions once dummies are included.
3
1
It is hard to compare directly the variability of the rates of change and
the levels because the standard deviations are in different units. For the
level of United States real per capita money for the period as a whole, for
example, the standard deviation is 62.5 percent. This means that roughly
30. The F values between the periods for regressions with a zero constant term of real per
capita money on real per capita income and dummies are 1.3 for the United States (1 and 43
degrees of freedom); .01 for the United Kingdom (1 and 31 degrees of freedom); and .32 for
the United States plus the United Kingdom (1 and 79 degrees of freedom). The results are
similar for regressions including other variables, and for regressions with a constant term.
31. The relevant analysis of variance is as shown in table 6.N.2 on p. 252.O w>
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O252 Velocity and the Demand for Money
two-thirds of the observations are between 1004.625, or 61.5 percent of
the mean, and 162.5 percent of the mean. For rates of change there is
little point in expressing the variation relative to the mean, since the
mean may be zero or negative. The comparable rate of change standard
deviation is 2.25 percentage points per year, which means that two-thirds
of the annual rates of changes are within 2.25 percentage points of the
mean annual rate of change. Perhaps one way to make the comparison is
to note that the mean interval spanned by the three phases from which
rates of change are calculated is four years for the United States, five and
one-half years for the United Kingdom, so the standard deviation of the
total percentage change in money over this interval is about 9 percent of
the initial value for the United States, only a seventh of the 62.5 percent
standard deviation of levels. For the United Kingdom, the corresponding
figures are 32.6 and 1.75 percentage points per year, or about 10 percent
for a five and one-half year span, less than a third of the standard
deviation of levels. Clearly, eliminating the longer period movements by
the use of rates of change has also eliminated most of the variability.
As a result, allowing for the effect of real per capita income on real per
capita money (or of real per capita money on real per capita income) and
of the shifts has a much less dramatic effect on the standard deviations,
reducing them, if trend is allowed for by including a constant term, from
2.25 percentage points per year to 1.59 for the United States, and from
Table 6.N.2 Analysis of Variance of Differences between Demand for Money
Regressions for the United States and the United Kingdom
Based on Rates of Change
Source of
Variation

















































aSee note 24, above.253 Effect of Population and Prices
1.75 to 1.42 for the United Kingdom (and for real per capita income from
2.57 to 1.68 for the United States, and .96 to .90 for the United King-
dom). Comparison of these reduced standard errors, multiplied by the
average span on which they are based, with the residual standard errors
of the levels, after allowing for real per capita income and the shifts, is
much more illuminating than comparing the original standard deviations.
For the United States the residual standard error of the level of real per
capita money is 6.5 percent; four times the residual standard error of the
rate of change is 6.4. For the United Kingdom, the residual standard
error of the level is 6.3 percent; five and one-half times the residual
standard error of the rate of change is 7.8 percent. The final results are
therefore roughly the same: real per capita income and the shifts leave
about the same residual error as the more sensitive adjustment for trend
in the form of rates of change.
What these results mean is that the relatively small short-term move-
ments of real money balances reflect primarily variables other than the
contemporaneous changes in real per capita income or the shifts we have
isolated. We have reached this conclusion before for movements within
cycle phases. It is the basis for our suggestion that the demand for real
money balances depends on permanent rather than measured income.
3
2
The present results indicate that a similar, but weaker, conclusion holds
for the longer periods to which our rates of change refer—averaging four
years for the United States, five and one-half for the United Kingdom.
Over such periods, the variation in both real balances and real income is
small, and each is heavily affected by variables that do not affect the other
in the same way. Over longer periods, the changes in real money balances
and real per capita income cumulate and become more and more impor-
tant relative to the short-term perturbations.
6.5 Effect of Population and Prices
In the preceding section we assumed that f$ = 7 = 1 in equation (3),
that is, that any change in prices or population implied an equal percent-
age change in the quantity of money demanded (mathematically, the
demand for money in nominal terms is homogeneous of the first degree in
population and prices). This section tests that assumption. Take loga-
rithms of both sides of equation (3), add terms to allow for the demand
and postwar shifts, and rearrange to:
(20) log m = log k + a log y + ((3 - 1) log N
32. M. Friedman, The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results,
Occasional Paper 68 (New York: NBER, 1959); reprinted in Friedman, Optimum Quantity
of Money; Friedman and Schwartz, "Money and Business Cycles," p. 44.254 Velocity and the Demand for Money
Alternately, solve equation (20) for log y, giving:
(21) log y = - (I/a) log k + (I/a) log m - [(p - l>a]log N
- [(y - iya] log P - [\/a]W - [\/a]5.
Clearly, if p = 7 = 1, the coefficients of log N and log P are zero in both
equations (20) and (21).
The values of k, a, (3, and 7 obtained by fitting equations (20) and (21)
to the data for the United States and the United Kingdom are summa-
rized in table 6.9.
3
3 For both countries, the calculated price elasticities as
computed from the money on income and income on money regressions
are consistent with the theoretical value of unity—one estimate exceed-
ing, the other falling short of unity. For the United Kingdom, that is true
also of the population elasticity, but it is not for the United States, for
which both limits exceed unity. For the United States plus the United
Kingdom, the range of both population and price elasticities excludes
unity, but the limit for each is clearly not significantly different from
unity. All in all, therefore, the only serious discrepancy from theoretical
expectations is for the United States population elasticities.
Columns 5 and 6 provide an additional test by comparing errors of
estimate of equations omitting population and prices (i.e., forcing
P = 7 = 1) and equations including them. For four of the six comparisons,
the inclusion of population and prices explicitly has a sizable effect,
reducing the standard error substantially. There is one exception for each
country: the income on money regression for the United States, the
money on income regression for the United Kingdom.
One possible explanation for these results is that population and prices
are serving as proxies for other variables. For prices, the other variable
may be interest rates, since there is the well-known Gibson paradox
phenomenon of a positive correlation between prices and interest rates.
For population, the obvious other variable is time trend, since we know
that population moves very slowly over time.
The effect of including population and prices on the value of a is
consistent with the interpretation of population as a proxy for trend. The
lower and upper limits of a (from the regressions of money on income and
income on money, respectively) are far wider apart in table 6.9 than in
table 6.6, indicating that inclusion of population and prices has reduced
the correlation between real money per capita and real income per
capita, both of which display consistent upward trends. Some other
variable, presumably population, is clearly serving as a trend term.
33. Note that because PandN enter explicitly in these equations, the statistical estimates
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The final two columns in table 6.9 test this explanation by substituting a
short-term interest rate for the price variable
3
4 and by allowing for trend
instead of population—in column 7 by including time as a variable, in
column 8 by including the lagged value of the dependent variable. These
substitutions give lower standard errors of estimate in ten out of twelve
comparisons, and in some comparisons decidedly lower standard errors.
3
5
The equations including the interest rate term and trend (correspond-
ing to column 7 of table 6.9) go even further than the equations including
population and prices in the direction of absorbing some or most of the
relation between money and income. For the United States and the
United Kingdom, the effect is to widen the range between the lower and
upper limits of the computed income elasticity—from .63 and 1.13 to .61
and 1.17 for the United States, from .65 and 1.62 to .42 and 2.54 for the
United Kingdom. For the United States plus the United Kingdom, the
effect, surprisingly, is the reverse, to narrow the range, from .60 and 1.45
to 1.23 and 1.86.
Parallel calculations for rates of change give very similar results. Dif-
ferentiating equations (20) and (21) with respect to time gives:
(22) gm = a gy + O - l)gN + (7 - l)gP + XiWg + X2Sg (23) gy = [Va]gm - [0 - iya]gN - [(y - iy<x]gP
Table 6.10, the counterpart for rates of change of table 6.9, gives
almost identical results. The computed population and price elasticities
are in general, though not uniformly, consistent with the hypothetical
values of unity; the inclusion of population and prices explicitly has a
trivial effect on the standard error of estimate for three comparisons,
reduces it moderately for three; in the latter cases the same or an even
greater reduction in the standard error is achieved by including an in-
terest rate and a trend term instead of population and prices.
3
6
As for levels, the inclusion of population and prices absorbs some of
the effects of the correlation between money and income, widening the
range of the estimated income elasticities (compare table 6.10 and table
6.8, zero-constant term). Replacing population and prices by interest rate
34. Tests summarized in section 6.6.1 indicate that a short-term rate generally gives
better results than a long-term rate. However, the interest rate used here is not the
differential interest rate we finally settled on in section 6.6.
35. We have also computed regressions including population and prices along with
interest rates and a trend term. In general, these give standard errors of about the same size
as those in columns 7 and 8. However, in a few cases the addition of population and prices
does reduce the standard error appreciably, indicating that they are not simply proxies for
interest rates and time.
36. Trend is allowed for simply by introducing a constant term into the regression.
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and trend widens them further, modestly for the United States and




The results for both levels and rates of change are reasonably consis-
tent with the assumption (3 = 7 = 1. Any apparent influence of popula-
tion and prices can readily be interpreted as a disguised reflection of the
influence of trend and interest rates.
The most interesting substantive result from our explorations is the
effect on the computed elasticities of allowing explicitly for trend. For
both the United States and the United Kingdom, introducing trend
absorbs much of the effect of income and widens the range of the
estimates of income elasticity. This result admits of two very different
interpretations. One is that there is a secular trend in the quantity of
money demanded produced by some secularly changing variables other
than income itself—for example, urbanization, or increasing specializa-
tion in production—for which income is serving as a proxy and for which a
trend term is a better proxy. This explanation is certainly plausible.
An alternative interpretation is that the quantity of money demanded
is related to a longer term income magnitude than average income over a
phase, and that the trend term itself is serving as a proxy for such a longer
term magnitude. Numerous demand studies for money have shown that
some concept of permanent real income or wealth is more closely con-
nected with the real quantity of money demanded than is current income.
However, these studies have mostly been for quarterly or annual data.
We conjectured initially that our phase data would be closely enough
linked to permanent income to make the distinction of little empirical
significance. But perhaps that is wrong.
Column 8 of table 6.9 and column 7 of table 6.10 were included as a
simple way to cast some light on this interpretation. Allowing for trend in
a regression of money on income by including the lagged value of the
quantity of money is equivalent to estimating permanent income as a
weighted average of current and prior values of income with the weights
given by an exponential whose value declines the earlier the income value
weighted—this is the adaptive expectations approach—and hence to
regarding the quantity of money demanded as a function of permanent
income. Similarly, in a regression of income on money, including the
lagged value of income is equivalent to regarding income as a function of
"permanent money" estimated by the same kind of exponentially
weighted average of present and past values of money.
The results are reasonably consistent with this interpretation. For the
money on income regressions and for both levels and rates of change, the
37. For the United States, to 0.64 and 1.42; for the United Kingdom, to 0.40 and 5.40; for
the United States and United Kingdom, to 0.68 and 1.79.259 Effect of Costs of Holding Money
inclusion of lagged income consistently gives a lower standard error than
the use of the trend term. For the income on money regression, this is true
for only three out of six comparisons, and in general any effect is smaller
in magnitude—which is certainly what would be expected if permanent
income systematically affects desired money balances. It is difficult to
give any persuasive interpretation to "permanent money" as determining
real income, which is why the asymmetry of the results supports the
alternative interpretation. Moreover, the regression coefficients are not
unreasonable. They imply that the mean period of averaging in comput-
ing permanent income is roughly two or three phases, and that the
elasticity of money demand with respect to permanent income is roughly
the same as the lower limits computed more directly, allowing only for
the shifts, as given in tables 6.6 and 6.8.
3
8
6.6 Effect of Costs of Holding Money
The quantity of money that people wish to hold is affected by the costs
and returns from holding money. The direct costs and returns—in the
form of expected losses, storage charges, interest received—are generally
neglected and treated as zero. However, Benjamin Klein has demon-
strated that, at least for the United States, allowance for these direct costs
and returns can appreciably improve the statistical estimates of demand
38. The estimated weight on the current phase value of income in computing permanent
income (b), average period of weighting, in phase units (1/&), and estimated permanent
income elasticity (dnVdyp) are as follows for the United States and the United Kingdom, for
levels and rates of change:
Levels Rates of Change
b lib dmldyp b Mb dmldyp
United States .55 1.8 1.12 .40 2.5 1.55
United Kingdom .62 1.6 0.79 .60 1.7 0.78
These estimates were derived from the coefficients of the following regressions:
mt = log k + ay, + SRS + 8m,_i + KXW + X.2S,
gm[ = log k + agyt + 8 gRs + egmt_t + XtWg + X2Sg. We assumed that permanent income for the United States is estimated by adding a trend
element of .02 per year, which for phases averaging two years in length means .04 per phase,
to a weighted average of current and past measured incomes. On this assumption
b = 1 - 6 + .04
dm a
For the United Kingdom, we assumed a trend element of .0125 per year, which multiplied
by the 2.75 year phase average length of the United Kingdom phase, gives .034 as the trend
allowance.260 Velocity and the Demand for Money
curves.
3
9 Klein obtains a statistical counterpart to these direct costs and
returns by neglecting the direct costs and returns associated with currency
and with losses from bank failures but including an allowance for interest
paid on deposits, whether interest is paid directly, as was legal for all
deposits in the United States before 1933 and for time deposits thereafter
(and throughout in the United Kingdom),
4
0 or indirectly through render-
ing services without charge or granting loans at lower than market in-
terest rates. He allows for both direct and indirect payments by assuming
that banks pass on to their customers the net income they receive from
their earning assets and estimating this net income on the basis of market
interest rates. This procedure is equivalent to including the ratio of
high-powered to total money as well as a market interest rate in the
demand for money function.
4
1 We have experimented with this method of
allowing for the direct costs and returns from holding money and report
the results below.
The major return from holding money is indirect: the nonpecuniary
services rendered by money. The adjustment we have made for increas-
ing financial sophistication of the United States before 1903 already
allows for one element of these services. For the rest, we treat this return
39. Benjamin Klein, "The Payment of Interest on Commercial Bank Deposits and the
Price of Money: A Study of the Demand for Money" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago,
1970).
40. However, cartel agreements among the banks, dating from 1877 and effective from
World War II on, prohibited direct interest payments on United Kingdom current accounts.
In 1877 London joint stock banks agreed to abolish all interest payments on current
accounts, although there is evidence that many banks evaded the agreement before World
War I. Certain provincial banks did not end the practice of paying interest on current
accounts until World War II, when all banks agreed not to compete for deposits by
increasing interest payments. Cartel agreements among the banks dating to 1886 deter-
mined the rate of interest to be paid on deposit accounts by reference to the margin between
bank rate and the deposit rate, but again there were many exceptions. See C. A. E.
Goodhart, The Business of Banking, 1891-1914 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972),
pp. 178-88; B. Griffiths, "The Development of Restrictive Practices in the U.K. Monetary
System," Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies 41 (March 1973): 6-7.
41. Let H = C + B be high-powered money, with C = currency, and B = bank reserves
denned as the banks' total holdings of high-powered money. Let R = a market interest rate
on securities comparable to bank earning assets in period to maturity. Then Klein treats
interest paid per dollar of deposits as equal to R(l - BID), where D equals total bank
deposits. This includes interest paid indirectly on demand deposits plus interest paid directly
on time deposits. Income earned by a holder of money per dollar would then be a weighted
average of the zero earned per dollar of currency and the above sum earned per dollar of
deposits, or
C + D C + D M
 K M
}'
where M = C + D = the money supply.261 Effect of Costs of Holding Money
as embodied in the demand function, which means as primarily a function
of the real quantity of money held. This procedure is incorrect insofar as
technical changes have altered the productivity of money balances in
yielding monetary services—as apparently they did to a marked extent in
the United States before 1903 and must have to some extent in the United
States since then and in the United Kingdom before and since.
The major indirect cost of holding money is the income foregone from
the assets that could have been held instead of the money. The opportun-
ity cost depends on the alternative considered and on the period of time
for which the alternative is regarded as sacrificed. In addition, we must
distinguish between the alternative cost ex post—the realized return on
the alternative asset—and the alternative cost ex ante—the anticipated
return. We can only measure the cost directly ex post, yet what is relevant
to the demand function is the alternative cost ex ante.
As we noted in chapter 2, possible alternative assets are numerous for
each holder of money and vary widely from holder to holder. For busi-
ness enterprises, the key alternatives to holding money are larger hold-
ings of financial and physical assets or reduced liabilities in the form of
borrowing from banks, other short-term borrowing, long-term debt, and
equity. For ultimate owners of wealth, and for our concept of money, the
major alternatives include mutual savings deposits, savings and loan
shares, government and private debt obligations, equities, and physical
assets, or reduced liabilities in the form of mortgages on owned homes
and debt on other consumer goods.
For each alternative, the ex post return in nominal terms that is
sacrificed for any given period includes the explicit yield in nominal terms
during that period plus the change in the nominal price of the asset during
that period. For some alternatives, for example borrowing from banks
(neglecting the possibility of default), mutual savings deposits, savings
and loan shares, and series E United States government bonds, the
change in price is zero because the obligation can be paid off or redeemed
on demand at a fixed nominal price. For these alternatives also, the yield
is generally known in advance so that there is no significant difference
between the nominal return ex ante and ex post—though of course there
may still be a difference between the real return ex ante and ex post. For
marketable obligations, such as commercial paper, bonds, and particu-
larly equities, a change in the nominal price of the asset may be an
important component of the ex post return. For some obligations that
have a stated maturity value such as commercial paper and bonds, the
change in price will itself consist of two parts, one that results from the
amortization of any premium over, or discount from, the value at matur-
ity, the other, from the change in market yields. The first is embedded in
calculated market yields and hence can be regarded as known ex ante.262 Velocity and the Demand for Money
The second cannot be known in advance and the ex ante equivalent to this
part of the ex post return is an anticipated change in market yields.
For equities, which have no stated maturity value, and for physical
assets such as fixed capital and inventories for business enterprises, or
owned homes, automobiles and other consumer capital for ultimate
wealth owners, the change in market price tends to be a still larger part of
the nominal return and no part of the change is known ex ante. Almost
the whole of the return on these assets must be based on anticipations.
The period of time for which the alternative is regarded as sacrificed
and therefore for which the ex ante yield is relevant is an elusive concept.
Money balances are held for a wide variety of possible contingencies, the
timing of some of which, such as recurrent trips to market, is reasonably
predictable, the timing of others, such as emergency needs for ready
funds, is highly uncertain. In principle, the whole term structure of yields,
for all possible holding periods, is relevant to the quantity of money
demanded. For example, no one would hold money instead of an in-
terest-bearing asset if he were certain that he would not have to draw on it
for a very long time. Yet he may hold money even though there is a
sizable possibility that he may not have to draw on it for a very long time.




Given the multiplicity and complexity of the yields that are relevant, it
is perhaps not surprising that statistical studies of the demand for money,
which have had to use a small number of observable yields, have pro-
duced divergent and confusing results. Almost all such studies confirm
the expected negative relation between yields on alternative assets and
the quantity of money demanded. However, studies for different coun-
tries and periods, and even studies by different scholars for the same
country and period, have yielded widely divergent conclusions about the
particular yield that is most closely related to the quantity of money
demanded. The studies have explored (1) short-term yields on nominal
assets; (2) long-term yields on nominal assets; (3) yields on equities; (4)
anticipated rates of price change, computed as weighted averages of past
rates of price change and interpreted as the nominal yield on physical
assets. And these four classes of yields have of necessity covered only a
small part of the range of assets that are effective alternatives to the
holding of money. For most such assets, there simply are no market yields
to observe.
Item 4, anticipated price change, has generally been dominant when-
ever there has been substantial inflation, perhaps partly because gov-
ernmental intervention has often made it impossible to observe the other
42. See Milton Friedman, "Time Perspective in the Demand for Money," Scandinavian
Journal of Economics 79, no. 4 (1977): 397-416.263 Effect of Costs of Holding Money
yields. For other countries and times, the effect of anticipated price
change has been hard to detect, either because our measures are defec-
tive or because the bulk of its effect is allowed for by item 1, the yield on
nominal assets, which tends to be raised by expectations of inflation. Item
3, yield on equities, is hard to measure and hence has been explored in
only a few studies.
For countries and periods not characterized by substantial inflation,
items 1 and 2, short- and long-term yields on nominal assets, have been
the yields generally explored. These studies show no uniformity. Some-
times a short-term yield gives better results, sometimes a long-term yield,
and when both are included the relative coefficients are unstable. This
result is not inconsistent with theoretical reasoning, which suggests that
the relative weight of yields for different holding periods should itself
depend on the level and term structure of yields.
The consistent finding that the yield displays the expected negative
relation with the quantity of money demanded presumably reflects the
existence of a structure of yields that tends to move more or less together.
If this is so, then the yield that is included in a demand study, or the small
number of yields that are included, enter as a proxy or proxies for the
whole structure of yields rather than in their own right. On this view, the
particular yield that shows the closest relation depends on the yield that
happens, in the particular circumstances, to be the best proxy for the
yield structure as a whole.
We conclude that it would be desirable for the focus of research to
change, that we should give up the attempt to find an asset or a small set of
assets that can be regarded as the closest substitutes for money and
instead recognize that money is so pervasive and the range of substitutes
so broad that we should seek rather to find a compact way to describe the
whole structure of yields—the "general" level; the "tilt" of the yield
structure to maturity; and the "difference" between real and nominal




43. H. Robert Heller and Mohsin S. Khan, "The Demand for Money and the Term
Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Political Economy 87 (February 1979): 109-29,
have taken up this suggestion and applied it to United States quarterly data for 1960-1976.
They approximate the term structure by a quadratic in maturity, then use the three
parameters of the quadratic in a demand for money function, concluding that "this approx-
imation performed favorably relative to standard specifications of the money-demand
function that utilized only one interest rate as the opportunity-cost variable as well as the
ones that introduce several interest rates. Furthermore,... the function using this particular
approximation appeared to be stable during a period when standard functions using only
one interest rate display significant shifts in parameters" (p. 127).
We have ourselves not been able to use this approach for the United States and the United
Kingdom because of the large research expenditure that would have been required to get264 Velocity and the Demand for Money
6.6.1 Yield on Nominal Assets
Our own explorations of different nominal yields have simply con-
firmed the results of other studies.
In our calculations, we have generally used two interest rates for each
country: one a rate on a security with a short maturity, the other a rate on
a security with a long maturity.
4
4 For levels, we have fitted equations of
the form:
(24) log m = log k + hsRs + hLRL + terms in other vari- ables,
where m, as earlier, is real per capita money balances (for the United
States, adjusted for changing financial sophistication), all logarithms are
natural logarithms, Rs is a short-term rate of interest, RL a long-term
rate, and k, hs, bL and similar coefficients of other terms are parameters
to be estimated. Some equations include only Rs, others, only RL; still
others, both.
For rates of change, we have fitted equations of the form:
(25) gm = K + hsDRs + §LDRL + terms in other variables,
where D is used as a symbol for a time derivative or absolute difference
(as compared with the symbol g that we have used for a percentage rate of
change or time derivative of a logarithm). Some equations include an
intercept (K)—which is equivalent to allowing for a constant time trend in
satisfactory term structure data for the United Kingdom. We report in an appendix to this
chapter (see 6.9) some experiments we have made for the United States.
Perhaps the most interesting and exciting empirical implication of their and our calcula-
tions is the evidence they provide on a conclusion reached on purely theoretical grounds in
Friedman, "Time Perspective in the Demand for Money" (see note 42), that a steepening in
tilt of the term structure, that is, a rise in long-term rates accompanied by a decline in
short-term rates sufficient to keep the average level of interest rates constant, will reduce the
quantity of money demanded. Both bodies of data confirm that conclusion, though we note
that the relevant evidence from the Heller-Khan data is not that which they themselves
adduce.
44. In principle, holding period, not maturity, is the time-duration concept relevant to
the demand for money. However, maturity is the only readily available proxy for holding
period. The interest rates used are:
United States short rate: sixty-to-ninety-day commercial paper rate through 1923; there-
after four-to-six-month commercial paper rate.
United States long rate: high-grade corporate bond yield.
United Kingdom short rate: three month rate on bankers bills.
United Kingdom long rate: yield on consols.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 give phase averages and rates of change for an alternative United States
short rate, the call money rate (/?$•)> and an alternative United States long rate, the basic
yield on corporate bonds (RL)- Our decision to use the ones listed above instead was based
on a large number of trial regressions. In general the rates we use gave higher correlations
than the alternatives, but the difference in results was often small and sometimes in the
opposite direction.265 Effect of Costs of Holding Money
the level variables, that is, to using the time differential of equation (24)
when one of the other variables is time; other equations do not include an
intercept, that is, force K = 0, which makes equation (25) equivalent to
the time differential of equation (24), when time is not included among
the other variables. As for levels, some equations include only Rs; others,
only RL; still others, both.
The inclusion of interest rates rather than their logarithms in equations
(24) and (25) implicitly assumes that the absolute rather than percentage
change in interest rates is what matters for the demand for money—that a
one-percentage point higher interest rate will produce the same percent-
age reduction in the quantity of money demanded whether it is added to a
base rate of 5 percent or to a base rate of 10 percent. On this assumption,
a semilogarithmic slope, like 8S or 8L, is the relevant measure of the
interest rate effect, even though this parameter is not free from units of
measure but has the dimension of time.
An alternative would be to include the logarithms of interest rates
rather than the interest rates themselves. The corresponding regression
coefficients would be interest elasticities, free from units of measure. This
would assume that elasticities rather than slopes are the same at all levels
of interest rates.
Theoretical considerations in favor of a constant slope rather than
elasticity are: (1) per dollar of money held, the cost of a change in the
interest rate depends on the absolute, not the relative change in the
interest rate; to put this point differently, a doubling of an interest rate of
1 percent is much less of a stimulus to reduce cash balances than a
doubling of an interest rate of 10 percent; (2) an interest rate of zero does
not imply infinite desired cash balances, yet a constant elasticity other
than zero produces infinite cash balances at an interest rate of zero; (3) an
expected rate of price change is a measure of cost logically similar to a
nominal interest rate, and it seems desirable to treat the two cost mea-
sures in the same way, yet the expected rate of price change can be
negative, ruling out logarithms.
One consideration against a constant slope is that, at high interest
rates, desired cash balances will be small and will be used for high-priority
purposes so that a rise of one percentage point is likely to produce a
smaller percentage reduction in money balances than a similar rise at
lower levels of interest rates. However, that is not an argument for a
constant elasticity but rather a warning that the linear approximation
used in equations (24) and (25) cannot be expected to hold over more
than a limited range of values of the interest rate or the expected rate of
change in prices.
Empirically, the two approaches give similar results for interest rates in
the general range of those observed in the past century in the United
States and the United Kingdom. We have not compared the two266 Velocity and the Demand for Money
approaches for the phase bases used in this book. However, in earlier
work with annual data we concluded that the semilogarithmic form gave
better results than the logarithmic.
4
5
Before we discovered the critical importance of the postwar readjust-
ment and the upward demand shift, our regression results were very
mixed. We found it necessary to supplement regressions for the period as
a whole by regressions for subperiods, and we also calculated a large
number of alternative regressions to try out different interest rate series.
All in all, we calculated literally hundreds of regressions for different
periods and different sets of independent variables. The introduction of
shift variables for the postwar readjustment and the upward demand shift
brought order into our results, particularly by rendering the various
subperiods homogeneous. As a result we have been able to simplify our
exposition greatly by restricting attention to regressions for the whole
period and, indeed, only a subset of those. We note here only that the
conclusions we derive from the regressions we do present are entirely
consistent with those we had earlier derived from a much more numerous
set of regressions—which we now interpret as a cumbrous and inefficient
way to allow for the postwar readjustment and the upward demand shift.
Table 6.11 summarizes regressions for both levels and rates of change,
comparing short- and long-term interest rates as variables in money
demand equations. Each successive line refers to a single regression. The
lines come in triplets: the first is for a regression that includes only the
short rate; the second, for one that includes only the long rate; the third,
for one that includes both the short rate and the long rate. Columns 1 to 4
give limits on the semilogarithmic slope of real per capita balances with
respect to the relevant interest rate. The remaining columns provide
evidence on the goodness of fit. For pairs of equations containing the
same variables except that one contains Rs and the other RL, a higher t
statistic implies a lower standard error of estimate, so that column 7
simply duplicates columns 5 and 6. For the third equation in the triplicate,
containing both, this is also true, though less obviously: the standard
error will be less or greater for the third than the first according as the t
value for RL is greater or less than unity. Similarly, it will be less or
45. See also a similar conclusion reached by C. A. E. Goodhart and A. D. Crockett,
"The Importance of Money," Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England 10 (June 1970): 192.
M. J. Hamburger found that the semilogarithmic form gave better results than the logarith-
mic for quarterly German (1963-70) and United Kingdom (1963-71) demand functions
("The Demand for Money in an Open Economy: Germany and the United Kingdom,"
Journal of Monetary Economics 3 (January 1977): 29,34). However, most authors of money
demand functions have measured interest rates in logarithmic form. In particular, S. M.
Goldfeld obtained good results from such a form for post-World War II United States data
(see his "The Demand for Money Revisited," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no.
3 (1973) pp. 577-646).267 Effect of Costs of Holding Money
greater for the third equation than for the second according as the t value
for Rs is greater or less than unity.
The results are highly consistent: when only one interest rate is in-
cluded in the regression, the interest rate slopes are negative, and, with
one exception, the rvalues are higher for the short- than for the long-term
rate; when both interest rates are included, the short rate dominates and,
with one exception, the standard error is intermediate between those for
the equations including only one interest rate. These are the results for
level equations, for rate of change equations with a zero intercept, and
for rate of change equations with a nonzero intercept. (The exception for
t values is for the United States short-term rate, for rates of change,
nonzero intercept; for standard errors, for the United Kingdom rates of
change, zero intercept.) The conclusion is clear: the short-term interest
rate is preferable to the long, and there is no justification for including
both.
As to the magnitude of effect, the limits on the slopes are as usual
farther apart for the rate of change equations than for the level equations,
but generally the wider rate of change range includes the narrower level
range, so the two sets of results from levels and rates of change confirm
one another. There seems no appreciable difference in slope between the
United States and the United Kingdom.
To judge from the results based on the greatest amount of evidence—
for the United States and the United Kingdom combined and the level
data—the slope for the short-term interest rate is between -2.8 and
—11.8. Since the average value of the short-term interest rate was .037,
this corresponds to an elasticity at that average value between —. 10 and
-.44.
6.6.2 Interest on Deposits
Nominal yields on assets other than money measure the return on
substitutes for money—in terms of the usual demand function for a
commodity, they are the counterpart of the price of a substitute, and the
elasticities cited in section 6.6.1 are the counterpart of cross-elasticities.
The counterpart of own-price in the usual demand function is the yield
on money itself in the form either of services rendered without charge or
explicit interest paid on demand deposits or the time deposits we include
in our concept of money. However, whereas the own-price is usually the
first variable to be considered in demand studies for most commodities
and services, we have left it next to last. It is ordinarily completely
neglected in money-demand studies on the (implicit) ground that it can
be treated as zero. As we noted earlier, Benjamin Klein's study is an
exception, and he concluded that allowing for own-yield improves de-
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Following Klein, we allow for own-yield by assuming that currency
yields a zero nominal yield and that banks are forced to pass on to their
depositors the bulk of the interest they receive on their assets. However,
assets held in the form of reserves, that is, high-powered money, earn
zero return; hence this approach is equivalent to assuming that the return
on money is a weighted average of zero (the return on currency and the
high-powered reserves that are the counterpart to some deposits) and the
market interest rate (the return on the rest of deposits), the weights being
H/M (the ratio of high-powered money to total money) and 1 - H/M.
This requires, in effect, including Rs{\ - H/M), where Rs is the market
interest rate, in regressions as an own-price, along with Rs as a price of a
substitute.
Table 6.12 shows the effect of the inclusion of own-yield, namely
(1 - H/M)RS, in the demand for money regressions. The inclusion of
own-yield, in addition to the short-term rate (Rs), consistently lowers the
standard error of estimate (compare lines 1 and 2 in each triplet).
Theory suggests that the difference between the yield on close substi-
tute assets and on money should be the relevant variable, since this
difference measures the marginal cost of holding an extra dollar as money
rather than as an alternative nominal asset. The closeness in absolute
value of the coefficients of the short rate and the own rate (columns 1 and
2 for line 2 of each triplet) is consistent with this theoretical expectation.
Accordingly, in line 3 of each triplet we include the difference in yield—
that is, Rs - (1 - H/M)RS = RSH/M, which we designate RN, the Prefer- ring to nominal. With two exceptions (levels for United Kingdom and for
United States and United Kingdom) this equation yields a lower standard
error than either of the others. Moreover, the resulting coefficients are
very similar for the United States and the United Kingdom and are
consistent for levels and rates of change.
4
6
46. In an excellent article examining the statistical validity of Klein's results, John A.
Carlson and James R. Frew ("Money Demand Regressions with the Rate of Return on
Money: A Methodological Critique," Journal of Political Economy 88 [June 1980]: 598-
607) correctly point out that the improvement in Klein's fit obtained by approximating RM
(yield on money) by (1 - HIM) Rs and including RM in a demand equation along with Rs
may be spurious, reflecting errors of measurement common to m and HIM. If both
numerator and denominator of HIM are divided by NP, the denominator becomes m.
Errors of measurement in m that arise from errors in NP will not be common (they cancel
out in HIM), but errors of measurement in M will be. They will tend to produce a spurious
negative correlation between m and HIM, or a spurious positive correlation between m and
(1 - HIM). Carlson and Frew point out further that such common errors will also introduce
spurious elements into the computed coefficients of Rs and RM. (They note quite properly
that the fact that Rs is common to Rs and RM does not of itself introduce any bias in the
estimates because both are independent variables. This may however affect the variances
and covariances of the estimates.) The spurious element contributes to the coefficients271 Effect of Costs of Holding Money
These results confirm Klein's and suggest including in the demand
function the differential yield on nominal assets, rather than the short
rate alone or the short rate plus own-yield. At the same time they also
show that the effect of substituting the differential yield for the short rate
alone, while statistically significant, is quantitatively small: for levels, the
substitution reduces the standard error by 8 percent for the United States
but raises it by 3 percent for the United Kingdom; for rates of change, the
largest improvement is a reduction of the standard error by 2 percent.
Hence, for some purposes in later chapters, where including the differen-
tial yield greatly complicates the analysis, we shall omit it and include
instead the short rate.
having opposite signs and, if the coefficient of RM is positive and that of Rs negative, as is the
case in both Klein's and our calculations, to a higher absolute value of the coefficient of Rs.
Some sample calculations by Carlson and Frew for Klein's results suggest that the
spurious element could explain his results, though they are careful to note that the case is not
proved, since the economic forces Klein emphasizes would work in the same direction as the
spurious correlation, and their sample calculations do not discriminate between the spu-
rious and the real effects.
One implication of the Carlson-Frew analysis of spurious correlation, pointed out but not
exploited by them, does differ from an implication of economic reasoning and hence
provides a basis for discriminating between the spurious and the real effects. As noted in the
text, economic forces suggest that the differential rate, Rs - RM> is
in
e relevant alternative
cost of holding money. It follows that on economic grounds the semilog slopes of Rs and RM
should be numerically equal. On the other hand, Carlson and Frew point out that the
spurious statistical effects would produce numerically equal elasticities (p. 601, especially
footnote 1). For their replication of Klein's result, the slope of Rs is 12 percent less in
numerical value than on the slope of RM; the elasticity of Rs is 20 percent greater (our
calculation for the elasticity at the mean values of Rs and RM). So far as this calculation goes,
it argues somewhat in favor of real forces rather than spurious correlation accounting for
Klein's results.
The purely spurious statistical element that Carlson and Frew emphasize affects our
results in the same direction as Klein's. However, the effect is very likely decidedly smaller
quantitatively. Our basic data are phase averages, Klein's annual, which tends to reduce the
variance of errors of measurement compared with "true" fluctuations. For rates of change,
our estimating them from triplets of phases reduces still further the relative magnitude of
pure errors of measurement. This conclusion is supported by a number of pieces of
empirical evidence. (1) The correlation between M and HIM or their rates of change is
uniformly small. For levels it is negative, as both the spurious element and the secular
decline in HIM would imply, but only - .135 for the United States, - .184 for the United
Kingdom. For rates of change it is positive, .045 for the United States, .095 for the United
Kingdom. (2) Adding of RM reduces the standard error of estimate far more in Klein's
equation, as recomputed by Carlson and Frew, than in ours (in Klein's by 37 percent; in ours
by a maximum of 12 percent in the three comparisons for levels; by much less, in the
comparisons for rates of change). (3) Klein's equation yields statistically significant coef-
ficients for both Rs and RL in an equation including RM, for RL but not Rs in an equation excluding RM. In our case Rs has a statistically significant coefficient in level equations
(including and excluding RL, including and excluding RM) (see tables 6.11 and 6.12). (4)
Including RM raises the /-statistic (in absolute value) for Rs for Klein's equation from 1.4 to






















































































































3274 Velocity and the Demand for Money
6.6.3 Yield on Physical Assets
Alternatives to holding money include not only the nominal-value
assets whose yields were considered in section 6.6.2 but also financial
assets, such as equities, that have no stated nominal value and physical
assets held directly, such as land, buildings, machinery, and consumer
capital. The financial assets generally represent indirect titles to physical
assets, so we shall refer to this class of assets as physical assets, in effect
treating all nonhuman wealth as falling into one of three classes: money,
other nominal-value assets, and physical assets.
The nominal yield on physical assets, like the yield on financial assets,
consists of two parts: the direct yield—rent on literal physical assets,
dividends on equities—and the change in the nominal price of the assets.
And again, the relevant yields for determining the attractiveness of these
assets relative to money are the anticipated yields.
Most money-demand studies that have included the yield on physical
assets have allowed for only the second part of the yield and have
approximated it by the rate of change of a price level, often consumer
levels, from 3.8 to 5.3; for the two countries together, the /-statistic is reduced a trifle, and
that is also true for all but one of the rate-of-change comparisons.
Including RM does raise the absolute value of the coefficient on Rs for all of our results as
well as for the one result of Klein recomputed by Carlson and Frew. But that result is also
the one predicted by economic theory, as also is the positive sign of the own rate and the
numerically larger coefficient of RN than of either Rs or RM. Hence we do not regard these
findings as having much bearing on the quantitative importance of the spurious correlation.
In "Competitive Interest Payments and the Demand for Money: Economic Forces or
Spurious Correlation?" Michael Melvin recalculates Klein's demand for money function,
1919-70, substituting rd, the return on deposits, for Klein's rm variable, and tests the
regression results for evidence of real rather than spurious effects. For the shorter period
Melvin investigates, he finds that the slopes differ by more than the elasticities, suggestive of
spurious effects.
With respect to slopes versus elasticities, our results for levels support real forces versus
spurious effects much more strongly than Klein's. The slope of Rs is numerically greater
than the slope of RM for all three comparisons: by 14 percent for the United States, 52
percent for the United Kingdom, and 88 percent for the United States plus United Kingdom
(the opposite direction from Klein's result). Since the elasticity is the product of the slope
and the interest rate, and since Rs as calculated is necessarily greater than RM, it follows that
elasticities will differ in the same direction and by even more than the slopes. Evaluated at
the mean values of Rs and RM, the numerical elasticity is 58,94, and 144 percent greater for
Rs than RM for the United States, United Kingdom, and United States plus United
Kingdom, respectively.
For rates of change, the slope of Rs is numerically lower than of RM for five out of six
comparisons: by 3, 13, 9, 11, and 9 percent, and higher by 3 percent for the remaining
comparison (United States nonzero intercept). The elasticity of Rs is numerically higher for
all comparisons, the percentage excess corresponding to the above differentials for slopes,
being 32, 11, 21, 12, 20, and, for the one in the same direction, 41 percent. In all but one
case, the percentage difference is larger for the elasticity, and generally much larger.
All in all, we conclude that we can have considerable confidence that our results reflect
primarily real effects rather than spurious statistical effects.275 Effect of Costs of Holding Money
prices. This procedure has been dictated by paucity of data. There are no
satisfactory measures of the direct yield, except for dividends on equities,
or of the change in the nominal price of physical assets, except again for
equity prices on organized markets. But such equities are only a small
part of the total class of assets under consideration.
The use of the rate of change of prices—generally a weighted average
of past rates of change—as a proxy for the anticipated nominal yield on
physical assets raises the obvious problem that it may be a poor proxy.
But it also raises a more subtle problem. Arbitrage on capital markets
tends to equalize the attractiveness of the anticipated yields on different
assets—which means not that the yields will be equal but that differences
will reflect the value placed by investors on such features of assets as risk
and liquidity. Anything that changes the yield on physical assets will be
transmitted in whole or part also to nominal assets. As Irving Fisher
taught many years ago, the anticipated nominal yield on any asset,
expressed as a percentage of its value, can be regarded as the sum of an
anticipated real yield—that is, a yield after allowance for the effect of
inflation on both the income stream and the capital value—and an antici-
pated rate of change of prices.
Suppose we compute a multiple regression including as variables the
nominal yield on nominal assets and the anticipated rate of inflation
(rather than nominal yield) on physical assets. We are then measuring the
effect of a changed anticipated rate of inflation for a given nominal yield
on nominal assets. How can these coexist if there is arbitrage between the
assets? Only if the implicit real yield changes in the opposite direction so
that, for example, a higher inflation rate plus a lower real yield gives a
nominal rate on physical assets roughly equivalent to the assumed un-
changed rate on nominal assets. But in that case there are two opposite
effects on desired balances; by itself, the rise in the rate of price change
would lower desired balances; but, by itself, the decline in the real rate
would raise desired balances. Hence, in principle, even the sign of the
coefficient is ambiguous.
4
7 In practice there is not full adjustment; the
nominal yield serves, as we have stressed, as a proxy for the structure of
yields; the rate of price change is likely to enter as another proxy, and a
rise in it with a particular nominal yield such as Rs held constant is
probably to be interpreted as reflecting a rise in other yields at least as
much as a fall in the real yield; hence there is some presumption that its
coefficient will be negative. Nonetheless, the effect of the rate of price
change is diluted by the failure to include the real rate explicitly.
One way to allow for the real rate is to use the rate of change of nominal
income rather than of prices as a proxy for the nominal yield on physical
47. This point is developed fully by Norman Lefton, "The Demand for Real Cash
Balances and the Expected Permanent and Contemporaneous Rates of Change of Prices"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1972).276 Velocity and the Demand for Money
assets—a device employed by Maurice Allais on somewhat different
grounds.
4
8 The use of the rate of change of nominal income has the purely
statistical advantage that it is likely to be more accurately measured than
the rate of change of prices, particularly during periods of price control
(see sees. 4.1.3 and 4.2.3). But its main attraction is economic. The rate
of change of nominal income is the sum of the rate of change of prices and
the rate of change of output, and the rate of change of output is an
estimate, though a downward biased estimate, of the real yield.
4
9 Hence
the rate of change of nominal income can be regarded as a better proxy
than the rate of change of prices alone for the total nominal yield on
physical assets.
On these grounds we have experimented with both the percentage rate
of change of prices (gp) and the percentage rate of change of nominal
income (gY) as proxies for the nominal return on physical assets in
equations for levels of money holdings. In equations for rate-of-change of
money holdings, we have used the time derivatives of these rates of
change, designated Dgp Dgy respectively. One problem with both is that
we need a measure of anticipated rather than actual rate of change.
However, for our initial explorations we have assumed that for our phase
data we can regard actual and anticipated rates of change as identical.
Table 6.13 summarizes our regressions for both levels and rates of
change: gY clearly performs better than gP; every t value for gY is higher
than for gP in absolute value. Hence we shall use it as our proxy for the
nominal return on physical assets. The coefficients of gY uniformly have
the expected negative sign. For the United States and the United States
and United Kingdom combined, the coefficients deviate from zero by an
amount that is statistically significant. That is not true for the United
Kingdom alone. Even when statistically significant, however, the slope
coefficients are not very accurately determined. The range between lower
and upper limits is wide, so that while the ranges overlap for the United
States and for the United Kingdom, and for levels and rates of change,
that is no great comfort. The overlap may merely reflect the limited
accuracy with which we can estimate the coefficients.
The slope for gY tends to be decidedly smaller than that for Rs. It is
arithmetic that a one percentage point increase in the nominal yield,
whether on physical assets or on nominal assets, raises the cost of holding
money instead of the corresponding asset by the same amount. As a
48. See Maurice Allais, "Reformulation de la Theorie Quantitative de la Monnaie,"
Bulletin Sedeis, no. 928, suppl., 10 September 1965; "A Restatement of the Quantity
Theory of Money," American Economic Review 56 (December 1966), 1123-57; "Growth
and Inflation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 1 (August 1969), 355-426, in which
the velocity function depends upon past rates of growth of nominal income.
49. See R. J. Gordon, ed. Milton Friedman's Monetary Framework (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 37.277 Effect of Costs of Holding Money
matter of economics, it does not follow that the two increases would have
the same effect on cash balances. That depends on the composition of the
asset portfolio that would be held instead of cash. If that portfolio
consisted exclusively of nominal assets, a change in the yield on physical
assets would have no effect on cash balances for a given yield on nominal
assets, and conversely if the portfolio consisted exclusively of physical
assets. We have no direct evidence on what the proportions are, though
we do know that the bulk of all material wealth consists of physical assets,
if all accounts are consolidated.
5
0 It does not follow that, at the margin,
holders of money could not treat other nominal assets as the chief
substitute for money, though it does render any such result rather im-
plausible. If our computed slopes were accurate measures of the effect of
a change in the corresponding yield, their relative values would provide a
measure of the composition of the substitute portfolio.
The slope coefficients from table 6.11 for Rs are in general a substantial
multiple of the corresponding slope coefficients from table 6.13 for gy.
5
1
The implication, if the observed multiples were accurate estimates of the
50. In such a consolidation the only nominal value assets are high-powered money plus
government interest-bearing liabilities.
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3 J>280 Velocity and the Demand For Money
"true" multiples, would be that, at the margin, the bulk of any change in
money balances is as a substitute for nominal value assets. In light of




An alternative interpretation is that the market rate of interest is a
better measure of the relevant nominal yield on nominal value assets than
the rate of change of nominal income is of the relevant nominal yield on
physical assets. The one is a direct measure of yield, the other an indirect
measure; the one is quoted contemporaneously on a marketplace, the
other must be computed from inexact measures of a hypothetical total
after the event.
If nominal yields on nominal and physical assets tended to move
together, either would serve as a proxy for the other. That is the case for
short and long rates, which tend to move together. It is not, however, the
situation for nominal and physical assets. The correlation between Rs and
gY is -.189 for the United States, -.153 for the United Kingdom;
between their rates of change, -. 102 for the United States, -. 132 for the
United Kingdom, so that inclusion of gY introduces a variable largely
independent of others. It follows that it is desirable to include yields on
both nominal and physical assets in a demand equation for real balances.
6.7 Effect of All Variables Combined
The preceding sections suggest that the following variables should be
included in functions for the United States and the United Kingdom to
represent the demand for money, expressed in real terms and per capita
(m):
1. Changing financial sophistication for the United States—for which we
allow by replacing the raw monetary totals before 1903 by adjusted
totals that allow for a 2.5 percent per year increase in the quantity of
money demanded arising from this source alone.
2. Real per capita income (y).
3. The difference between the nominal yield on short-term securities and
the hypothetical yield on money, as a proxy for the differential yield
on nominal value assets sacrificed by holding money (RN).
4. The rate of change of nominal income, as a proxy for the yield on
physical assets (gY).
52. However, we should note that the standard Keynesian liquidity preference approach
takes bonds as the only substitute for money and so assumes that the whole of any change in
money balances is as a substitute for nominal value assets.
Even if physical assets are a decidedly poorer substitute for money per dollar than
nominal assets, they are so much more plentiful that the fraction of an additional dollar
added to or subtracted from money balances that is matched by an offsetting change in
physical assets might be expected to be of at least the same order of magnitude as the
fraction matched by an offsetting change in nominal assets.281 Effect of All Variables Combined
5. A postwar readjustment, allowed for by including a dummy variable
(W = - Tt after World War I, and + Tt after World War II)
6. An upward demand shift, produced by economic depression and war,
allowed for by including a dummy variable (5 = 1 for the phases
affected, 0 for the remaining phases).
We found that these six variables enable a single demand function to
describe fairly accurately the demand for money in each country for the
whole of the century our data cover. In addition, variables 3, 4, 5, and 6
have had about the same quantitative effect in the two countries, pro-
vided allowance is made for the different time periods for which items 5
and 6 are relevant.
Item 1 refers only to the United States. The one significant difference
of response to any of these variables that we have detected is with respect
to item 2: real per capita income. The income elasticity of demand for
money is apparently above unity for the United States, below unity for
the United Kingdom.
Table 6.14 presents the final equations for the United States and the
United Kingdom as derived in three ways: from the levels, from the rates
of change with a zero constant term, and from rates of change allowing
for a trend via a nonzero constant term. All the coefficients are of the
correct sign, and most differ from zero by a statistically significant
amount. Three features of these results are most encouraging:
1. The consistency of results from levels and rates of change for both
the United States and the United Kingdom, though for reasons discussed
earlier the postwar readjustment has a larger effect on rates of change
than on levels and the upward demand shift has a larger effect on levels
than on rates of change. As usual, the correlation is higher for levels than
for rates of change.
Consistency does not mean that the coefficients are identical. The
coefficients of the two shift variables aside, because these have a different
meaning for levels and rates of change, all but one of the other coef-
ficients is less in absolute value for the rate of change equations with a
nonzero intercept than for the level equations. This is the relation to be
expected. The coefficients are lower limits (in absolute value) because of
the regression effect (the coefficient of income is also biased toward unity
because of statistical errors in prices and population). The lower correla-
tion for the rate of change equations means that the regression effect is
larger for them.
The standard errors of estimate for level and rate-of-change regres-
sions are not readily comparable. However, as earlier, we can make a
rough comparison by multiplying the percentage per year standard errors
from the rate of change equations by the average interval between the
first and third of the triplet of phases from which each rate of change is
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the level, which is a value at a point of time. For the United States, the
result is modestly higher than the level standard error (6.16 and 5.92, for
equations with a zero and a nonzero constant, vs. 5.09); for the United
Kingdom, considerably higher (7.64 and 7.37 vs. 5.54).
These results are in line with the theoretical expectation that estimates
from the level equations can be expected to be the most reliable of the
three sets of estimates.
2. The closeness of the coefficients for the United States and the
United Kingdom. Only the coefficients of the income term from the level
equations differ significantly between the two countries. Even the stan-
dard errors of estimate are not far apart for the two countries.
For the income term from levels, the estimated elasticity for the United
States is 1.15, for the United Kingdom, 0.88; the difference, 0.27, is
roughly five times the standard error of the difference—highly significant.
For the income term from rates of change, the difference is in the same
direction as for levels, but is not statistically significant, being roughly
equal to the standard error of the difference for both forms of rate-of-
change equations.
The only other difference is in overall level of demand, on which we
cannot use the results in table 6.14, since the United States data are in
dollars and the United Kingdom data in pounds. We shall return to this
point later.
Allowing for the yields has reduced the size of the difference between
the United States and the United Kingdom in income elasticity, but
unfortunately it has not eliminated the difference. The reason for this
difference is the major mystery for which we have been unable to find an
explanation.
The implication is that, income aside, the same basic forces affect
money demand in the two countries, have the same quantitative impact,
and leave the same residual to be explained by statistical error or omitted
economic variables.
We shall exploit this implication by constructing a single equation for
the two countries combined.
3. How far we have been able to go in accounting for fluctuations over
a century in real money holdings on the basis of six variables only. The
implication is that money demand is stable over time—in the sense of a
demand function—as well as between countries.
This excellent overall result is misleading in one respect. Although the
income elasticities can be regarded as having been estimated fairly pre-
cisely, the slopes of the two yield variables are much less precisely
estimated. This is brought out by table 6.15, which gives upper and lower
limits based on regressions run both ways for the coefficients of the three
quantitative economic variables.284 Velocity and the Demand for Money
The generally far wider limits for the rate-of-change regressions than
for the level regressions simply reinforce the earlier conclusion about the
greater reliability of the level regressions.
But even for the level regressions the coefficients of the yield terms are
not specified very precisely. Taking the results from the regressions for
two countries, the range is from - 9 to - 40 for the slope of the differen-
tial yield on money and from - 0.2 to -12 for the proxy yield on physical
assets.
Note that these are slopes, not elasticities. To convert them into
elasticities requires multiplying them by the value of the relevant yield.
Doing so at the mean value of the yields gives an elasticity of -0.10 to
- 0.32 for the differential yield and - 0.01 to - 0.49 for the proxy yield.
As a final summary of our results, we present two single equations for
the two countries combined, one computed from levels, one from rates of
change. For the level equation, we add a country dummy (Z = 1 for the
United Kingdom, 0 for the United States) to allow for the difference in
level (and perhaps also for a deviation between the market and relevant
exchange rate), and we add a term equal to the product of the country
dummy and the logarithm of real per capita income (Z times log y) to
allow for the difference in income elasticity between the United States
and the United Kingdom. The result is
(26) logm =- 1.47 + 71.14 logy- 9.3 RN - 0.47 gY
(9.6) (52.1) (5.5) (3.1)
+ .019W + .1935 + 1.64Z - 0.25 Z log y
(4.7) (10.8) (6.2) (6.0)
R
2= .9889
SEE = 5.32 percent.
For income elasticities, this gives 1.14 for the United States and 0.89
(1.14 - 0.25) for the United Kingdom as lower limits—or very much the
same as for the separate country equations (table 6.15).
The -9.3 slope for the differential yield on money corresponds to an
elasticity of - 0.19, the - 0.47 slope for the proxy yield, to an elasticity of
-.02.
These results simply repeat the earlier ones.
5
3 The new result is the
coefficient of Z, which indicates the difference in level for the United
States and the United Kingdom. For this equation, the United Kingdom
figures were converted to dollars at the 1929 exchange rate ($4,862 to the
£). At that exchange rate table 6.16 gives the differences in level of money
53. We do not give upper limits because of difficulties in determining them produced by
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demand at the three income levels
5
4 isolated in chart 6.3, and at the values
of the other variables for the United States at the corresponding dates.
Though the difference between the two countries is substantial, it is
appreciably less than the difference when no allowance is made for
differences between them in yields on alternative assets. The correspond-
ing differences in chart 6.3 are + 40 percent for 1877 income levels; -13
percent for the 1975 United Kingdom income level; -30 percent for the
1975 United States income level. Allowing for yields has cut these dif-
ferentials almost in half. Nonetheless, the mystery of why there is a
difference in income elasticity remains.
The rate-of-change equation for the two countries combined, calcu-
lated with a zero constant term, to correspond with the absence of a trend
term in the level equation, is as follows:
(27) gm = 1.03 gy - 8.74 DRN - 0.41 DgY + .030 Wg (10.9) (2.7) (3.6) (3.7)




SEE = 1.54 percent.
The results are very similar to those for the level equation, except that
the difference between the income elasticities for the United States and
the United Kingdom is not statistically significant, as it was not for the
separate country equations. As is to be expected, the regression bias is
more serious, so that the coefficients of the income and rate-of-return
54. In 1877, United States and United Kingdom real per capita incomes (in 1929 dollars)
were equal. In 1975, United States real per capita income was higher than that of the United
Kingdom.287 Appendix A
variables are lower in absolute value (except for the United Kingdom
income elasticity).
6.8 Appendix A: Issues in Using the Exchange Rate to Pool
United States and United Kingdom Data
This appendix explores the problem of the exchange rate to use in
pooling the data for the United States and the United Kingdom.
The market exchange rate may not be the relevant exchange rate for
our regressions for two different reasons. One has been discussed in
chapter 5: the relation between the exchange rate and price levels in the
two countries can be affected by the composition of the balance of
payments, in particular the role of capital exports from or imports to each
country and of income from abroad from sources other than the current
sale of goods and services.
5
5 The second reason is more immediately
pertinent. The domestic prices in the two countries of goods traded
internationally for which there are no tariffs or export subsidies and for
which transportation costs can be neglected are necessarily in the same
ratio as the exchange rate. For example, if the exchange rate for the
pound sterling is $4.86, then such a good which sells for £100 in the
United Kingdom will sell for $486 in the United States. (This proposition
is sometimes known in the literature of international economics as "the
law of one price.") Of course, even for international goods, tariffs and
transportation costs may be sufficiently important to introduce substan-
tial deviations between the relative prices in different countries and the
exchange rate. But for other goods and services that are not traded the
deviation may be far greater. For each such good or service, an implicit
exchange rate can be calculated from domestic prices that may differ
widely from the market rate. For example, consider the price of an hour
of roughly comparable domestic service in the United States and the
United Kingdom. The exchange rate required to make these two prices—
one in pounds and the other in dollars—equal when converted to a
common currency might be, say, $10 to the pound rather than $4.86 if
domestic service is cheaper relative to internationally traded goods in the
United Kingdom than in the United States (as seems indeed to have been
the case). There are as many implicit exchange rates as there are identi-
fiable goods and services available in both countries. There is still a link
between these implicit exchange rates and the market rate—via substitu-
tion of trade for production, substitution among factors of production,
and migration of labor and capital—but these links may be very loose
indeed.
5
6 The tighter they are, the closer relative prices for different
55. See notes 4 and 14 in chapter 5.
56. For an excellent summary discussion of many of these issues and references to the
literature on them, see Irving B. Kravis, Alan W. Heston, and Robert Summers, "Real288 Velocity and the Demand for Money
goods in different countries will be to the market exchange rate; the
looser they are, the wider will be the variation of relative prices for
different goods from the market exchange rate.
Consider a money-holding unit (an individual, a business enterprise, or
a government or other unit) deciding on the amount of money to hold. By
holding an extra dollar (or pound) of money, it saves, say c cents (or
pence) in pecuniary costs plus receiving, say, nonpecuniary returns it
values at n cents (or pence). Neither c nor n, of course, is a constant; the
size of both depends on the real amount of money held (m) and the level
of real income (y) or wealth. By holding an extra dollar (or pound) of
money, the unit incurs a cost of, say, R cents (or pence) that could have
been earned by holding alternative assets (including, of course, borrow-
ing less). And R too, of course, need not be a constant but may depend on
m, v, and other variables. The unit will tend to hold an amount of money
so that
for that amount of money and its level of income. In general, of course,
the higher c and n, and the lower R, for given values of m and v, the higher
will be desired m.
Each of the magnitudes introduced in the preceding paragraph (c,n,R,
m, y) raises a problem in using the market exchange rate for international
comparisons.
For c, the services in question are those that the use of money econo-
mizes, such as bookkeeping services. Casual observation suggests that
the relevant services involve mostly personal labor-intensive white-collar
services, and that such services have been cheaper relative to interna-
tionally traded goods in the United Kingdom than in the United States. If
these casual impressions are correct, they establish a presumption that
the relevant implicit exchange rate for such services (for 1929) is greater
than $4.86.
For n it is difficult to be equally specific because the alternative ways of
obtaining nonpecuniary services substituting for those rendered by
money are harder to visualize specifically (presumably, alternatives in-
clude insurance, credit lines, credit cards, larger holdings of financial or
physical assets, including such things as jewelry, and even different
employment).
For R there is clearly an international capital market. Nonetheless,
yields on domestic assets, for a country that has net foreign assets, are, as
Ricardo pointed out long ago, likely to be lower than on actuarially
GDP per Capita for More Than One Hundred Countries," Economic Journal 88 (June
1978): 215-42.289 Appendix A
equivalent foreign assets because of additional transactions costs associ-
ated with holding foreign assets, and because of the general preference
for investing at home. In principle, both these factors are taken into
account through c and n—the transactions costs through c, the preference
for domestic assets through n—provided that the interest rate used is the
higher yield on foreign assets. In practice, however, we use the domestic
interest rate, so some effect may remain. However, a more important
factor is probably the capital exporting or importing status of the country,
which will affect not only the market exchange rate but also interest rates.
For M and Y, nominal money and income, the market exchange rate is
clearly the relevant one—nominal dollars and pounds are internationally
traded goods par excellence. But what of m and y, real money and real
income per capita? For each country separately, we have followed the
practice of deflating nominal money and nominal income by the same
price index, the index implicit in estimates of real net national product.
The same practice for intercountry as for intertemporal comparisons
would mean using the same exchange rate for real money and real
income. The common exchange rate comparable to the internal price
index we use would be the purchasing power parity exchange rate, that is,
the average obtained by weighting all implicit exchange rates for goods
and services by the contribution of each good and service to national
product. As noted earlier (sec. 6.4.1), an estimate of the purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) exchange rate in 1929 can be made on the basis of a
recent direct estimate for 1970. The estimated rate in $5.50.
Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978) estimate that, for 1970, the
purchasing-power-parity exchange rate of the United Kingdom pound in
terms of the United States dollar was 117 percent of the market rate for
traded goods, 173 percent of the market rate for nontraded goods, and
139 percent for both combined.
5
7 The large difference for traded goods
may reflect primarily the definition of traded goods used in making this
calculation rather than the effect of tariffs and transportation costs.
Traded goods were defined as including all commodities as finally sold, so
even the final prices for most commodities "contain large service ele-
ments attributable to trade and transport margins."
5
8
The 1970 estimate of the ratio of the purchasing-power-parity ex-
change rate to the market rate can be extrapolated to a different year by
multiplying it by the ratio of the change in internal prices between 1970
and that year in the United States to the corresponding change in the
United Kingdom. If PPP(t) is the estimate of the purchasing-power-
parity exchange rate in year t, then '
57. Ibid., p. 216.
58. Ibid., p. 224.290 Velocity and the Demand for Money
where PPPd is a direct estimate for time t2 and P is the implicit price index
for the country designated by the subscript and the indicated date. This is
essentially the method used in footnote 5 of chapter 5 to get an estimate
for 1873-78 based on 1929 data of the ratio of incomes in the United
States and the United Kingdom. For 1929, this method gives a purchas-
ing-power-parity exchange rate of $5.50 in 1929, or a ratio of 1.13,
compared with the 1970 ratio of 1.39. Similar estimates for the ratio of the
purchasing-power-parity to the United States-United Kingdom market
exchange rate are plotted in chart 6.5, annually, 1868-1975.
Chart 6.5 shows that "the law of one price" came much closer to being
satisfied before 1932 than from that year on. This is the first and most
important conclusion. The first sharp isolated peak is for the year 1932.
That point provides a dividing line for the periods before and after 1932.
For the period before 1932, the average ratio was about 1.12; that is, on
the average, the purchasing-power-parity exchange rate was 12 percent
above the dollar exchange rate. The dollar exchange rate during the fixed
exchange-rate period was $4.86, so the purchasing-power-parity change
rate was 12 percent above that, or about $5.40, or very close to the
estimated value of $5.50 for 1929, the year we use as the base for our real
income and money series. What is even more interesting is the fluctuation
about the mean. Before 1932, the highest ratio is only 10 percent above
the average; the lowest ratio, only about 10 percent below. So the
purchasing-power-parity exchange rate fluctuated within a narrow range
of plus and minus 10 percent, which seems consistent with a reasonably
unified market, given the statistical error in estimates extrapolated back
by a period of 38 to 102 years (from 1970 to 1868 to 1932), plus the time it
takes for adjustment. The main movements of the purchasing-power-
parity rate seem to reflect inflation and deflation in the United States. The
purchasing-power-parity exchange rate went down from the 1880s to the
1890s when prices were falling in the United States relative to prices in the
United Kingdom and went up thereafter when prices were rising.
The situation after 1931 is very different. In September 1931 the
United Kingdom went off the gold standard. Thereafter, the United
Kingdom had an exchange rate that was sometimes floating but mostly
pegged by the Bank of England, with occasional large devaluations—
temporarily fixed but subject to change. The United States stayed on the
gold standard for two more years and thereafter also had a mixture of
floating and pegged rates. The source of the sharp spike in 1932 is that
1932 was the one year when the United Kingdom was off the gold
standard and the United States stayed on it. The depreciation of sterling
made United Kingdom goods cheap relative to United States goods;292 Velocity and the Demand for Money
equivalently, it meant that one pound could buy a larger quantity of
goods than could the number of dollars corresponding to that pound
according to the market exchange rate. In 1933 the United States went off
the gold standard. The dollar depreciated even more than the pound had.
As a result the ratio drops suddenly and drastically. From then on there
were successive ups and downs. Each prominent peak in the series
thereafter corresponds to a United Kingdom devaluation.
The picture is quite clear. Every now and then, for whatever reason,
the United Kingdom government has stepped in and either devalued the
currency deliberately or permitted it to depreciate. That has forced the
purchasing-power-parity exchange rate out of line with the market ex-
change rate. Then market forces set in to correct it. The highest peak is
for 1949-50, and that corresponds to the immediate post-World War II
devaluation of the pound in 1949. The market then gradually starts to
bring the ratio back down toward about 1.2. Before it gets there, another
devaluation occurs and the ratio shoots up again. The market again
brings it down, the United States devaluation in 1971 speeding up the
process. Then, to go beyond the period covered by the chart, the depre-
ciation of the pound in 1975 and 1976 pushed it up again. Once again, it
has started coming down toward the range that market forces dictate.
The average for the period after 1931 is not much different from the
average for the period before 1931—1.21 compared with 1.12. The real
difference is in the fluctuations—plus and minus 10 percent before 1931,
from minus one-quarter to plus one-third thereafter.
Since 1931 there have been tremendous improvements in communica-
tions and in transportation. The jet aircraft now spans the ocean in a few
hours. Satellite transmission and television and radio communications
link countries instantaneously and at relatively low cost. The cliche is it
has become one world. In the economic world, the reality is clearly the
reverse. The law of one price was far closer to being satisfied before 1931
than after. The technological improvements, which might have been
expected to unify the world, have been more than offset by governmental
intervention, which has fragmented the world into separate, isolated
markets. Chart 6.5 demonstrates vividly how powerful and effective
government intervention has been in rendering the law of one price far
less applicable after 1931 than it was before.
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59. For an interesting approach to the same issue from a different perspective, see Sven
Grassman, "Long-Term Trends in Openness of National Economies," Oxford Economic
Papers, n.s., 32 (March 1980): 123-33. His broad conclusion is that "several European and
North-American economies have roughly the same degrees of openness today as a century
ago" (p. 123). His detailed tables for decades (tables Al and A3) confirm our own finding
about the difference between the periods before and after 1930. For decades before 1925,
both foreign trade and foreign capital movements are more important for the United
Kingdom relative to national income than for decades after 1944. That is on the average also
true for the United States though less consistently.293 Appendix A
It is worth repeating that the deviations of the purchasing-power-parity
exchange rate from the market rate do not affect the slope of our
money-income relations so long as the same adjustment is made for both
money and income, but they do affect the United Kingdom income in
pounds that is regarded as equivalent to the United States income in
dollars. Hence they will affect our estimates of the difference in level of
real money balances for a given real income—though even here, as we
have seen, any effect is likely to be quantitatively minor.
The effects would be more far-reaching if a different adjustment were
made for money than for income. But that issue is not basically one of
how to make international comparisons; it arises for each country sepa-
rately. For example, consider the use of time-series data to derive the
relation between real food expenditure per capita and real income per
capita. For such a study it might well be fruitful to deflate nominal food
expenditure by a food price index and nominal income by a general price
index. Using the latter index for both is equivalent to examining the effect
of real percapita income not on real food expenditure but on the fraction
of income spent on food—the counterpart to our relations that can be
regarded as relating velocity to income. Put differently, our use of the
same index for money and income means that we are in effect defining
real money as the number of weeks' income to which it is equivalent.
The use of different index numbers for money and income could in
principle contribute to explaining our puzzle of the different elasticities in
the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, suppose that
the ratio of the relevant price index for money to the relevant index for
income fell in the United Kingdom over the century but remained con-
stant in the United States. That would make the computed income
elasticity of separately deflated money higher than the elasticity we
computed. However, we know no student of the demand for money who
has explored this route, we have not ourselves done so, and we have not
thought of any feasible way to establish a presumption about the direc-
tion of effect. Hence we simply mention but do not further explore this
possibility.
The same issue arises of course with respect to the unobserved vari-
ables c and n. If, for given real income, and other relevant variables, the
ratio of the price index relevant to these variables to the general price
index had fallen over time in the United Kingdom relative to the corre-
sponding ratio for the United States, that would have reduced over time
the ratio of desired m in the United Kingdom to desired m in the United
States for the equivalent real incomes per capita—which would, in our
calculations, have reduced computed United Kingdom elasticity relative
to United States elasticity. Offhand, it seems more nearly feasible to
pursue this possibility than the preceding one, by estimating purchasing-
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c, at least, and perhaps also n, depend disproportionately on the price of
nontraded goods. However, that would be a far more laborious task than
we have thought it justified to undertake for our purpose.
6.9 Appendix B: Incorporating the Term Structure of Interest Rates
in the United States Demand for Money Equation
This appendix describes the experiment, referred to in footnote 43
above, to incorporate the term structure of interest rates in the United
States demand for money equation. We first discuss the term structure
data set, then the generation of the parameters to describe the term
structure of yields, and finally the equation replacing the short-term
interest rate with the term structure parameters.
6.9.1 United States Term Structure Data
Annual estimates of yield curves for the best grade corporate bonds are
available since 1900.
6
0 For 1900-1941, the annual yield curves were de-
rived from averages of high and low sale prices of the best-grade corpo-
rate bonds during each month of the first quarter of the year. Yields for
1941 were based on January and February prices, and yields for later
years on February prices.
To match the period covered by our phase data, we needed term
structure yields for 1873-99 for all five maturities available for 1900-1970
and for 1971-75 for the one-year-to-maturity yields.
Our basic source for the period before 1900 was Macaulay's tables of
railroad bond yields.
6
1 He gives the yield of high-grade railroad bonds if
held to maturity for each month of each year. Maturity date is given as
part of the name for each bond. Following Durand, we used the February
yields for each year, excluding any bond whose maturity exceeded fifty
years—in some cases bonds with three hundred years to maturity were
listed. For each year i we estimated a yield curve, using the quadratic
function:
(Al) Rfr) = aOi + au T + a2i T
2 ,
60. The estimating procedure is described in David Durand, Basic Yields of Corporate
Bonds, 1900-1942, Technical Paper 3 (New York: NBER, 1942), p. 4. The data for five
maturities (1, 5,10, 20, and 30 years) are given in Historical Statistics of the United States,
Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, part 2, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the
Census, 1975), ser. X487-491, p. 1004. Data for 1979-75 for four maturities (5,10, 20, and
30 years) are given in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of the Census, 1976), p. 495. The Durand estimates were for the following years to
maturity (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60).
61. F. R. Macaulay, The Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the
United States since 1856 (New York: NBER, 1938), pp. A45-A78.295 Appendix B
where /?,- is the yield per bond in year /, T is years to maturity, and aOh alh
and a2i are parameters to be estimated for year i.
62 From this equation we
calculated the estimated bond yield for each year from 1873 to 1902 for
the five maturities (1,5,10,20, and 30 years) that are available from 1943
to 1970. We linked these estimates to the corresponding Durand esti-
mates by lowering the yield for each maturity by the average difference
between each pair of series in the overlap period, 1900-1902.
To supplement the four longer maturities for 1971-75, we estimated
the one-year yield to maturity, using the yields for the other four matur-
ities (the only ones available for these years) for each year in the quadra-
tic function.
Table 6.17 lists the anual yield to maturity estimates for 1873-1975. We
then calculated the phase averages for each maturity to conform to the
rest of our observations.
6.9.2 Estimating the Parameters of the Term Structure Yields
The estimation process described by Heller and Khan (see footnote 43
above) has two stages. In the first stage, estimates of a0, ax, and a2 were
obtained from the quadratic function (^41) for individual phases rather
than years. In the second stage, these parameters replace the phase single
interest rate included in the standard version of the demand for money
equation. As Heller and Khan note, a0 "can be viewed as a shift para-
meter for the entire term structure of interest rates" (p. 114). The slope of
the term structure equals at + 2a2 T, and the curvature 2a2. If the term
structure slopes positively, at least initially, and is concave downward,
generally taken to be normal, ax will be positive and a2 negative. With a
"U-shaped" yield curve, ax will be negative, and a2 positive. Table 6.18
lists the parameters of the yield curve for each phase observation.
For pre-World War I phases, the yield curve alternated between a
positive slope and negative curvature and negative slope and positive
curvature. The latter shape dominated the interwar years until 1927-29.
Thereafter, with only one exception through 1961-66, and again in the
1970s, the former shape predominated. Both parameters positive (1882-
85, 1957-58) or negative (1914-18, 1967-69, 1969-70) was rare. Heller
and Khan describe the case of negative slope and curvature as "fairly
unrealistic and does not appear to have occurred during our sample
period." The basic corporate yield data do, however, conform to such a
yield curve in 1967-70.
62. Heller and Khan (see note 43 of this chapter) used the same quadratic function but


















































Estimated Yields of United States Corporate Bonds by Term to
Maturity,, 1873-1975 (Annual Percentage):

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.9.3 The Demand for Money, with the Term Structure
of Interest Rates
We estimated the United States money demand equation, replacing Rs
with the three parameters of the term structure shown in table 6.18. The
results
6
3 for the alternate versions are as follows:
(A2) logm = -1.91 + 1.21 log}' - 2.85 Rs
(14.9) (64.4) (3.2)




SEE = 5.54 percent.
(A3) log m = -1.93 + 1.21 logy -2.78 a0 -298^
(15.1) (60.2) (2.6) (2.7)
-13823a2 -0.71gy + 0.1855 + 0.021 W
(2.8) (3.6) (4.8) (2.9)
R
2 = .9916
SEE = 5.64 percent.
In terms of goodness of fit, equation (A3) with term structure para-
meters does about as well as equation (A2) using the short-term interest
rate, and it yields statistically significant coefficients for all parameters. It
provides more information than equation (A2) by indicating the effect on
the demand for money of changes in the term structure of interest rates.
The intercept parameter has a clear meaning: an increase in a0 by .01
implies a one percentage point rise in the whole term structure. Hence,
the slope of the intercept parameter, a0, indicates that a uniform upward
63. Note that in these equations, the values for Rs and for a0, ax, and a2 are entered as decimals, not as percentage points, so that the values entered are 1/100 of values such as
given in tables 6.17 and 6.18. That is true also, of course, of gY-299 Appendix B
Table 6.18 Parameters of the Yield Curve for Each Phase Observation
(Interest Rates Expressed as Percentages)
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rise in the entire term structure by one percentage point will result in a
decrease of the logarithm of money balances by .0278, or in money
balances by 2.74 percent. This effect on money balances is almost identi-
cal, as of course it should be, with the effect obtained by using the
short-term interest rate, namely, a reduction in the logarithm of money
balances by .0285, or in money balances by 2.81 percent for each per-
centage point rise in Rs.
It is more difficult to interpret the coefficients of a1 and a2. If either at
or a2 alone rises while a0 and the other one are held constant, that will
raise the value of the interest rate for every maturity given by equation
(Al), and that in turn can be expected to reduce log m, as the negative
coefficients in equation (A3) indicate. However, that simply repeats the
finding for Rs from equation (A2) and for a0 from equation (A3). The
more interesting question is the effect of an increase in the slope of the
term structure while at the same time an appropriate average rate is
constant, namely, an average rate obtained by weighting different matu-
rities (really holding periods) by their importance in determining desired
money balances.
6
4 The calculated coefficients of the parameters a0, ax, a2
have imbedded in them the appropriate weighting function, but we do
not see any way to extract it.
This question has particular interest because a theoretical analysis of
money demand implies that an increase in the slope in this sense, which
decreases short rates while increasing long rates by enough to keep the
appropriate average rate constant, will decrease the quantity of money
demanded. This is counterintuitive. Short-term assets are a closer substi-
tute for money than long-term assets, and hence our intuitive expectation
is that a decline in short rates would tend to raise the quantity of money
demanded by more than the associated rise in long-term rates would
decrease it. The counterintuitive result reflects the countervailing in-
fluence of the weights. In general, closer substitutability of short-term
than of long-term assets for money will mean that they get a higher weight
in the appropriate substitute portfolio, which means that, to keep the
average yield constant, long-term rates will have to rise by more than
short-term rates fall, which offsets the closer substitutability of short-
term assets. Moreover, the greater the difference in substitutability, the
greater the difference in weights. Nonetheless, it is far from intuitively
clear that the net result must be in the direction of decreasing the demand
for money, which is why an empirical test is of great interest.
6
5
64. For a fuller discussion, see M. Friedman, "Time Perspective in the Demand for
Money," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 79, no. 4 (1977), equation (10) p. 408.
65. Ibid., pp. 410-11.301 Appendix B
Aside from the unavailability of the appropriate weighting function, a
further complication is that the slope is itself a function of maturity unless
a2 = 0.
Let T be a weighted average maturity, using the (unknown) appropriate
weights. Then the average yield for the appropriately weighted portfolio
is
(A4) R — a0 + afi + a2T
2 = a0 + a{T + a2 (T
2 + a
2.).
Suppose we concentrate on the slope of equation (Al) at T, which is
(A5) DR (T) = at + 2a2r.
Consider a change of AS in the slope of equation (Al) at f produced by
a change in al5 from ax to ax + Aax, and in a2 to a2 + Aa2, so that
(A6) Aal
The condition that R be unchanged requires that
(A7) (Aflj) T + (Afl2) (T
2 + o?) = 0.
Solving equations (A6) and (A7) simultaneously gives
(A8) Aflx = - J^4
 A5'
(A9) Aa2 = 2 AS.
Let bx be the coefficient of ax in equation (A3); b2, the coefficient of a2. Then the change in log m produced by a change of Aax and Aa2 in ax and a2 is
(A10) Alog m = ^xAfli + b2Aa2 .
To go further requires some assumption about the portfolio for which T
and al are to be calculated. We have considered two weighting patterns
which are simple to handle mathematically because both are charac-
terized by only a single parameter. One weighting pattern corresponds to








(A13) ^ = ^
T-
(A14) Afll=-2A5,302 Velocity and the Demand for Money
(A15) Aa2 = T-AS.
The other weighting pattern involves triangular weights declining from




(A18) o? = Ij
and
(A19) Aflj =
(A20) A«2 = |- AS.
The second pattern corresponds to the intuition that short-term securities
should have a heavier weight than long-term securities.
It turns out that for both weighting patterns, and for the calculated
values of b1 and b2, the effect on log m is the theoretically predicted
negative effect for small ro. As TO rises, the negative effect becomes
smaller in absolute value and ultimately turns positive. The value of io at
which it turns positive is 69.6 years, or a mean maturity of 34.8 years, for
weighting pattern w1; it is 92.8 years, or a mean maturity of 30.9 years, for
weighting pattern w2. These are far longer mean maturities than seem at
all plausible for relevant actual portfolios—indeed, the mean maturity is
longer than the longest maturities that we have used in calculating a0, ax,
a2. Hence, the theoretical implication about direction is amply con-
firmed.
What about magnitude of effect? Consider a rise in the slope at T of
.033 percentage points (.00033). That is equivalent to increasing the
differential between maturities thirty years apart by one percentage
point. And consider a value of T of 10 years, that is, a maximum maturity
in the portfolio of twenty years for weighting pattern w1 and_of thirty
years for weighting pattern w2. That rise in slope, for fixed R, would
decrease desired m by
39 percent for weighting pattern vvx
46 percent for weighting pattern vv2.
These seem extremely large effects, hard to reconcile with the value of
the coefficient of a0 in equation (A3), or of Rs in equation (A2). How-
ever, the coefficients of ax and a2 in equation (A3) are subject to large
sampling errors, hence these estimates are subject to a large margin of303 Appendix B
error. To check this effect, we raised the absolute value of b1 by one
standard error and reduced the absolute value of b2 by one standard
error—both changes tending to raise A log m algebraically. The result
was still a reduction in desired m but by much smaller, and more plausi-
ble, amounts: by
16 percent for weighting pattern wl
2 percent for weighting pattern w2.
The inaccuracy of the estimate reflects the inaccuracy in the computed
values of a0, ax, a2 based as they are on only five observations, and these
frequently not differing much. All in all, considering the element of
chance error in our estimates, we regard these results as a strong con-
firmation of theoretical expectations.
A direct comparison of our results with those of Heller and Khan is not
easy because of the different periods covered (1873 to 1975 versus 1960 to
1976); the different time unit (a cycle phase versus a quarter); the
different form of the quadratic term structure equation (dependent vari-
able R versus log R); the different range of interest rates entering into the
calculations (our one to thirty years versus their three months to twenty
years); and the different demand equation (per capita real money and
income versus aggregate real money and income, our inclusion and their
exclusion of gY versus our exclusion and their inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable).
In terms of direction, the coefficients of their counterparts of our a0, ax,
a2, are, like ours, all negative, though decidedly larger in absolute value
when the difference between the use of R and the use of log R is allowed
for, yet with roughly similar t values. In terms of the effect of an increase
in slope holding R constant (in this case, log R, that is, the geometric
mean), their results show a decrease in demand for TO less than 9.3 years
for weighting pattern wx, less than 12.35 years for weighting pattern w2,
or mean maturities of 4.6 or 4.1 years. It is perhaps not surprising that,
given their short time unit and narrower range of maturities, these
numbers are lower than those we found. In addition, the higher and more
erratic inflation after 1960 than during most of our period could be
expected to lead to considerably shorter-term portfolios, so, all in all, we
regard their results as not inconsistent with ours.
Two recent studies by Bilson and Hale and by Allen and Hafer point
out that Heller and Khan entered maturity incorrectly in computing the
quadratic term structure. Bilson and Hale correct the error and also find
that expressing the logarithm of the interest rate as a quadratic in the
logarithm of maturity fits the term-structure data better than a quadratic
in maturity. Allen and Hafer, using quarterly data for 1960-79, recom-
pute both the Heller-Khan and the Bilson-Hale equations and also find
that a cubic in the logarithm of maturity gives still better results.304 Velocity and the Demand for Money
The Bilson-Hale recomputation of the Heller-Khan equation strength-
ens its conformity with our results. The value of TO at which the effect on
log m turns positive is 35.9 years for weighting pattern 1 and 48.1 years for
weighting pattern 2, still less than the corresponding values for our
equation but much closer to them.
The Bilson-Hale and Allen-Hafer use of the logarithms of interest rate
and maturity rather than the interest rate and maturity complicates the
comparison of their results with our own. However, it is straightforward
to estimate the effect of a change in the slope of the term structure at the
geometric mean maturity while keeping the geometric average yield
constant. The results are that the effect of an increase in slope is in the
theoretically predicted negative direction for weighting pattern 1
(weighting pattern 2) for TO less than 3.2 (5.1) months and between 7.4
(10.7) months and roughly 100 (300) years; it is in the opposite direction
for TO between 3.2 (5.1) months and 7.4 (10.7) months, and greater than
roughly 100 (300) years. These results, therefore, are in line with our own
as well as with Heller and Khan's.
We have not attempted to analyze in the same way the Allen-Hafer
equation using a cubic to approximate the term structure. However, the
coefficients of the linear and quadratic terms (the counterparts of J^and
b2 in equation All) are almost identical with those for the Bilson-Hale
equation. Hence, the results cannot differ much.